Thread: Sdsr

Originally Posted by shimna01

Oh i very much agree with you that the TA COC is shite and needs severe re-adjustment. What happens to the keen intelligent fit Lt's that arrive who by the time they become Capts you wouldn't send out for a bottle of milk?

You could start by asking how much training do the Officers get after Sandhurst?

MK1(V) in their own time and most likely with little / no support to contextualise the information.

JOTAC (BattleGroup / Bde level) and no real opportunities to practise it.

MK2(V) in their own time and most likely with little / no support to contextualise the information.

TA ISC (Div level, 2 courses per year and one of those cancelled last year leading to a rather large bow-wave this year) and no real opportunities to practise it.

With possibly an OC's discipline course, 1 Bde study day per year and the occasional CAST weekend and some STA trg interspersed over the 8 years they require for Major.

MSR

Originally Posted by msr

You could start by asking how much training do the Officers get after Sandhurst?

MK1(V) in their own time and most likely with little / no support to contextualise the information.

JOTAC (BattleGroup / Bde level) and no real opportunities to practise it.

MK2(V) in their own time and most likely with little / no support to contextualise the information.

TA ISC (Div level, 2 courses per year and one of those cancelled last year leading to a rather large bow-wave this year) and no real opportunities to practise it.

With possibly an OC's discipline course, 1 Bde study day per year and the occasional CAST weekend and some STA trg interspersed over the 8 years they require for Major.

MSR

Just out of sheer interest. How does that contrast with the Regular Training program ?

MK1(v) has fewer modules than MK1, but picked up on the TA crammer at JOTAC

JOTAC same (although option for 2 week TA reduced version exists)

MK2(v) again, fewer modules.

TA ISC 2 weeks vs regular 9 months!

The main difference is that a TA officer can reach Major whilst staying in RD and having never carried out his job on operations or for any extended period of time. It is very unlikely that a regular officer would. The regular officer would have also done untold CAST/TESEX cycles probably including time as OpsO, or other BG or Bde staff officer. Each would have lasted between 5 days and 3 weeks. The TA officer might have done a few weekends at it, mostly playing catch up because it has been 6 or 12 months since they last had a run out as a HQ.

This results in the average TA officer having an understanding of it all, but at a very superficial level. You don't really get an in depth understanding of anything by going flat out at it, but only for 48 hours per year.

I don't know if this has been published here so:

Reserve Forces Parliament

Minutes of the All Party Group for Reserve Forces and Cadets Meeting 7th July 2010 – Committee Room 16

includes comments such as:

Joan Walley MP explained that a TA Army building in Cobridge was in the middle of a very deprived area and that it was hugely important to local social cohesion as different communities used it for a variety of things. She asked that when looking at future lay down, the SDSR take into account the contribution the building, the cadets and the reserves made, not only to the Forces but also to the local community. There should be a tick sheet in the SDSR that included the importance of the wider contribution they make within marginalized communities.

Hd RF&C replied that this was a part of what was wanted for the future, the footprint of the reserves and cadets was essential to connecting with the nation and MoD needed to find a way to preserve this. There was a lot of estate that cost a lot of money to maintain and the Review of Reserves concluded it needed to be rationalized and modernized. It was hoped that one of the outcomes of the SDSR would be the opportunity to do this and the way was through the RFCAs who managed and understood the estate and how best to use it. The Minister agreed before reinforcing the point that cadets provided opportunities to escape those deprived areas. He mentioned Shaun Bailey, who was brought up on a council estate and who now runs a children’s charity. Shaun was a firm believer in the cadet movement and that it could help this cause; it was something everyone needed to understand. Regarding footprint, he was well aware of the need to keep the forces in the public eye, as there had been a growing disconnect with the population at large, and the ‘high’ today, arising from operations in Afghanistan, might not last.

The Chairman reported that the biggest complaint he had received regarding the Review of Reserves was it contained nothing about what motivates an officer to make the sacrifices involved in serving as a volunteer reservist officer.

Originally Posted by The_Duke

MK1(v) has fewer modules than MK1, but picked up on the TA crammer at JOTAC

JOTAC same (although option for 2 week TA reduced version exists)

MK2(v) again, fewer modules.

TA ISC 2 weeks vs regular 9 months!

The main difference is that a TA officer can reach Major whilst staying in RD and having never carried out his job on operations or for any extended period of time. It is very unlikely that a regular officer would. The regular officer would have also done untold CAST/TESEX cycles probably including time as OpsO, or other BG or Bde staff officer. Each would have lasted between 5 days and 3 weeks. The TA officer might have done a few weekends at it, mostly playing catch up because it has been 6 or 12 months since they last had a run out as a HQ.

This results in the average TA officer having an understanding of it all, but at a very superficial level. You don't really get an in depth understanding of anything by going flat out at it, but only for 48 hours per year.

A good analysis - but lets remember that a good proportion of TA Officers do have Operational experience, albeit limited, and can be fast learners. The Bn I was with asked all three TA Offrs on that tour to go Regular, which must be some recommendation. One is now a Coy Comd, heard him on the radio from Afg last month.

The point here is that the training gap is NOT unbridgeable, given a willingness to act. A key issue is that the raw material is now the same, 1 AOSB, 1 main board etc. The ONLY difference is in the amount of training and given sufficient lead-time thats not a show-stopper, "The impenetrable Black Art of Modern War" or no.

...and as for the biff TA Offr, unable to understand 7 Qs, may I ask you to consider the quality - particularly the flexibility of thought - of some Regular LEs ?

saladin,

Point taken about the number of officers with a tour under their belt, but this also needs to be considered in context of the nature of their tour, how recently, role etc. A subbie who had a great tour in an FP Coy, for example, has a better insight into how the bigger picture works than one without. Unfortunately for him, it won't help him much if the next time he decides that he can deploy he is now a TA Major being chalked against a staff job. The better ones can catch up, but it is a big ask. The sufficient lead time factor helps - but is limited by the terms of RFA 96. We have just gone through the unit led MST package and there is little or no time available for meaningful staff training until they are through RTMC. Unfortunately the mobilisation dates mean that they are joining the units well into their own MST package - they have already gone through the lower level build up training and CAST. As such, those earmarked for HQ roles are suddenly thrown into a functioning BG or Bde HQ and swimming against the tide to catch up.

All possible, but only for the top third types.

On the subject of LEs, I would have the same statement in answer to any question concerning quality of units, cap badge etc. I have worked with some outstanding LEs with the intellectual capacity to work at the highest level. I have also worked with some who would have been lucky to get their boots on the correct feet for 3 days in a row.

I suppose that is the crux of my argument. Any statement that "the TA officer (generic) is capable of working at the sharp end of the COE" should really be much more focussed than many people seem willing to accept -

"Maj Snooks is capable of working at the sharp end of the COE. Maj Jones will be OK as a watchkeeper in BG HQ and has potential to develop over the course of the tour. Maj Smith would be overpromoted as LCpl Smith and must never be allowed to transit through Brize Norton"

Originally Posted by The_Duke

"Maj Snooks is capable of working at the sharp end of the COE. Maj Jones will be OK as a watchkeeper in BG HQ and has potential to develop over the course of the tour. Maj Smith would be overpromoted as LCpl Smith and must never be allowed to transit through Brize Norton"

Which makes you wonder how Maj Smith managed to get promoted to that level...

Fortunately I am top third*.

MSR
*Less for fitness at this exact time.

Originally Posted by msr

Fortunately I am top third*.

MSR
*Less for fitness at this exact time.

MSR how many were in the whole group ???????

Originally Posted by msr

Which makes you wonder how Maj Smith managed to get promoted to that level...

Fortunately I am top third*.

MSR
*Less for fitness at this exact time.

Systemic overgrading on OJAR/SJAR, legacy issues of people remaining who got there by "buggins turn", the ability of people to maintain the bluff for the 36 hours of a TA weekend or the few days in the field on a TA camp, career courses which are attendance only.

Once you add in people who were pretty good in their day, but unfortunately their day was 10 - 15 years ago you have plenty of contenders for that bottom third.

The key here is that the next generation will contain neither Snooks nor Jones if our training is limited to MATTS and C1 until selected for deployment. Smith will hopefully fail at the AOSB stage.

Originally Posted by saladin

The key here is that the next generation will contain neither Snooks nor Jones if our training is limited to MATTS and C1 until selected for deployment. Smith will hopefully fail at the AOSB stage.

Sadly true on Snooks and Jones. Unfortunately Smith still gets through the system - both regular and TA.

Originally Posted by saladin

The point here is that the training gap is NOT unbridgeable, given a willingness to act.

His Grace is making most of the arguments here, so I'll not bother repeating what he has wisely said. But this quote deserved a mention - bold text being the point. There is no willingness to act because - frankly - we do not need TA officers and SNCOs to do the high end jobs. That decision has been taken. ( My admiration goes to MSR by the way for pointing out the cravenly ineffectual nature of the higher reaches of the TA CoC and their bankruptcy in taking you down this road without having the cojones to publicly admit it.)

As for the "We could fight the Russians and that was pretty complicated and demanding job" argument, go back and read what I wrote, carefully. Fighting the Russians was an in extremis task where a lot of risk could be taken. Current ops are a discretionary task where no regular soldier is going to take the risk of putting an amateur in charge if there is the slightest suggestion that they are anything but as wholly up to speed as their regular counterparts. And face it, these days (with GCM et al) they never, ever, will be.

Originally Posted by shimna01

This thread about sdsr has very turned into the usual thread about the TA from the last 5 yrs

One group says: all the TA is good for is providing IR's - therefore anyone over the rank of sgt is to be confined to watchkeeping etc (new angle from His Grace now saying that most are not even up to that - you are LAND personified and i claim my £5!)

Another group says: we did it in the 80's we can do it again - unrealistic risk and frankly unfair under current TOS in the TA on serving TA soldiers and commanders

Why can we not do more than one thing? Why do we have to be one or the other?

I'm writing this on the hoof so i'll start with an apology!

We from the TA infantry (i can only speak of what i know) CAN provide excellent TA IR's from JNCO down who perform excellently on OPS (COE).

We from the TA infantry CAN provide excellent TA formed companies, with no regular staff, who perform within certain caveats, excellently on OPS (COE).

Lets do both - one tour a Bn provides a company of IRs, next tour we provide a formed company to provide FP for CLP's / or PMT teams or something similar (not static FP though!) and resource accordingly. Its a win win - guys get to do their thing and command element get to do theirs - TA survives as a strong, thriving and experienced organisation with good retention and develops slowly the experience within the TA as a whole. And the 'flyers' get ID'ed early and get on the required courses/exercises between tours to enable some sort of pool of commanders for ops - this my be cut-throat but it is the military after all.

My answer to those who say - my guys won't do FP! its not why they join! Is, from my understanding of the army, you do what your fucking told or fuck off. The TA is not just their to support the desire of a relativly small number who want to go abroad to shoot and kill people, we need to starting thinking about the organisation as a whole, how can we best look after, retain, develop and improve everyone? My impression speaking to the those about to deploy on H13 is that those that don't want to go as part of a formed company is probably as much to do with lack of trust and confidence in their own TA chain of command as anything else- we can fix that!

This is just a suggestion and is not perfect by any means but does it not best suit us as an organisation?


Comments

Interesting idea .... but the 80's bit ... you sort of said lets do it again??? (formed coys etc). Also with watchkeeping for Sgts and above - I don't get it?

Surely mainstream mobilising TA is JNCO below or Capt and above, maybe a few jobs for other ranks. Might be my capbadge but I don't really see much of a role for anyone Sgt or above without commissioning (to Lt or Capt).

Originally Posted by dergeneral

There is no willingness to act because - frankly - we do not need TA officers and SNCOs to do the high end jobs. That decision has been taken. .........Current ops are a discretionary task where no regular soldier is going to take the risk of putting an amateur in charge if there is the slightest suggestion that they are anything but as wholly up to speed as their regular counterparts. And face it, these days (with GCM et al) they never, ever, will be.

I'm pretty certain that, bar a few egotistical maniacs, no TA Officer imagines that they would be doing a "high end job". BUT..... even recent evidence shows that there are a pile of other jobs that need doing scattered about the Battlefield, HQs and the Rear. With young Captains leaving by the bus-load where is the next generation of SO2 Pissed Mattresses KAF ? Going to continue to rape the WOs & Sgts Mess for more LEs are we ? If the decision to kill off the TA Officer by slow strangulation has indeed been taken, some-one, somewhere has been even more short-sighted in their planning than usual. Frankly I don't think the Regular Army is that clever. I think its a cock-up, not a conspiracy.

Originally Posted by saladin

Frankly I don't think the Regular Army is that clever. I think its a cock-up, not a conspiracy.

It must be part of a plan - it's not like they don't have access to the stats is it? They know full well what has been going on with TA Offr recruitment over the last 10 years.

And if the regulars don't - then our grown-ups have been asleep at the helm.

MSR