ARmy Rumour SErvice

Originally Posted by msr

Originally Posted by The_Duke

I will be honest, 3 months as watchkeeper/LO after minimal PDT fits my work/family demands better than 3 months PDT, 7 months deployed at the moment.

Good point, well presented.

I suspect you are not alone.

MSR

Seconded.

I remember earlier chat about how 4 PARA were managing their HERRICK 8 commitment by mobilising people on a job-sharing basis, thereby enabling Capts/Majors (ie, those with generally more exacting work and family demands) to deploy. For non-crunchy jobs, this should be standard. If it is made this easy for everyone to deploy, then it is fair to impose a much sterner requirement to deploy.

Just cannot understand why this good practice is not more widespread.

Should also point out that not all non-crunchy jobs are amenable to 3-month tours, especially the COIN/influence stuff which requires time spent on the ground getting local feel required to generate the correct answers to Dilfor's Q1.

The_Duke

I'm not after an armoury full, I just want enough in the Battalion to train on, maybe 9 or so, enough to train people to use properly round robin style across the TAC's and enough to have a decent range package so at least troops have fired one for real before deploying.

Frankly Bowman is a piece of shite in a green box. Which needs a lot more work on it than Clansman did. I can be fairly confident that I can train to RRU without major problems on Clansman and not worry about sending people in harms way so trained. I doubt very much that I'd be able to train anybody to RRU on Bowman without a major headache every day. Headaches that people need to know about BEFORE they deploy.

In a nutshell, to me. The TA is being shafted to save pennies by a Government that's never been in touch with the real world and MoD is incapable of giving a toss.

And it's deeply worrying when kit that is part of the Infantry Orbat is UOR.

This was also a good shout:

Originally Posted by The_Duke

I had my fun earlier in my career (as the subbies are doing now), and my main reward/responsibility is training the next generation. Think DS at regular training establishments - toured before, will tour again afterwards, but for now they must work to ensure that their output (new soldiers) is up to the standard required so that THEY can go and do the business.

The point is, and in answer to MSR's question about the appeal of all this to new young officers (and, implictly, those in the ranks who should progress upwards) is that the new narrative - deploy early in your career in baddie-smashing role, then return and train the guys who follow, then deploy again in something less obvious but possibly cool, rinse, repeat - is actually a great, rewarding story. Meanwhile, you can always pray for a nice big war and the opportunity for the big-bollox roles and the bling.

Kitmarlowe: I totally agree that regular long courses should be open to the TA, and that attendance of TA bods on such courses should not be regarded as a waste of resources.

Originally Posted by Dr_Evil

This was also a good shout:

Originally Posted by The_Duke

I had my fun earlier in my career (as the subbies are doing now), and my main reward/responsibility is training the next generation. Think DS at regular training establishments - toured before, will tour again afterwards, but for now they must work to ensure that their output (new soldiers) is up to the standard required so that THEY can go and do the business.

The point is, and in answer to MSR's question about the appeal of all this to new young officers (and, implictly, those in the ranks who should progress upwards) is that the new narrative - deploy early in your career in baddie-smashing role, then return and train the guys who follow, then deploy again in something less obvious but possibly cool, rinse, repeat - is actually a great, rewarding story. Meanwhile, you can always pray for a nice big war and the opportunity for the big-bollox roles and the bling.

Kitmarlowe: I totally agree that regular long courses should be open to the TA, and that attendance of TA bods on such courses should not be regarded as a waste of resources.

Dr_Evil, what annoys me is that I was asked this question in November 1997, as a lance jack, at Larkhill after my presention on my time as an IR in rank with a regular unit. My answer then was I'd be quite happy to do regular Brecon, because a) it would be damm good training and b) No regular could then have a jab at me for doing a short course.

Originally Posted by "The_Duke

...enough CBA (as a minimum) and some Bowman (or indeed any radios!)

Tho' it can be got hold of, we just indented and received 100 sets of CBA (less plates though we could have those if we wanted apparently) for our forthcoming jolly on Ex Marble Tor (Gib) and we've been lent enough Bowman manpacks for two platoons plus PRR for all. Not bad for a non teeth arm... :D

Originally Posted by Kitmarlowe

Dr_Evil, what annoys me is that I was asked this question in November 1997, as a lance jack, at Larkhill after my presention on my time as an IR in rank with a regular unit. My answer then was I'd be quite happy to do regular Brecon, because a) it would be damm good training and b) No regular could then have a jab at me for doing a short course.

I hear ya. The trouble is, MOD types query the value for money of letting STABs on these courses, while diehard STABs don't want (a) there being a divide within their own units between those who have done the regular and semi-skimmed course; and/or (b) pressure from those in the ARAB chain of command to get more and more people to do the full-fat course.

I reckon there is probably as much VFM in sending a STAB on these courses as a regular. You'd get back unquantifiable (aye, there's the rub) benefits in terms of retention and improved quality of training which that person would be able to impart on his TA chums.

So far as the TA qualms mentioned above: as part of this whole shiny new TA thing, it really ought to be possible for more flexibility to be shown to the TA: tailored, job-sharing tours; short course or long course depending on availability of the soldier; even greater ability to flit in and out of regular service (as the Canadians have introduced). I'm saying all this for everyone's benefit. Not just mine. No, honestly.

Regarding kit: need to man up on that one, I think. Lack of kit has always been the bleat of any reserve force anywhere.

Originally Posted by The_Duke

Originally Posted by Charlie_Cong

the scary prospect for some is the reality of now for others, and we are not finding it as bad as other people seem to fear it will be. I had real concerns in 2004/5 when we seemed to be touring back to back, but now we have harmonised with the regular Bn tours, it is working quite well.

If this is true for 4 PARA, how was it achieved? To what extent can other units emulate it? Can the TA forum - for a change - be forward looking and practical?

Charlie

1. Accept the real world. Stop looking back wistfully, or dreaming of Utopia. You cannot go back to one, and the other is unobtainable. Deal with the present reality.

..and when the reality changes? i.e. the 'Regular' Army decides that it can cope alone. If the whole TA was predicated on the crocodile nearest the canoe, then it might as well all be Infantry now, to be disbanded when no longer required.

2. Be honest with potential recruits. We tell them on day one that they should accept the requirement to deploy. If they are not able to accept this, we redirect them elsewhere. Where? McDonalds?

3. Deployment is required - timeframe is discretionary. No-one is forced to go at a certain time against their will, or do multiple tours. If they cannot deploy at that time, they can defer without issue until a later tour. Multiple deferrals however result in a strong chat about their reasons for being there. This must apply across all ranks, not just the junior soldiers, with the headshed sitting back in the bar sending them on their way.

no pressure then

4. Manage expectations. We have lost the formed subunit tasks (thankfully) and concentrate on providing IRs to our regular Bns. As such, Officers are unlikely to command Pls or Coys on Ops, and same for SNCOs. It does not mean that they do not have some very good jobs to do. Similarly, your older "rejoiner" junior rank is unlikely to see the rifle Pl jobs, but could end up doing good work in the G4/support roles. They do their bit, but not always in the ways they would hope to do.

whoopee

5. Develop strong relationships with your regular units. That way, instead of just providing a number of bodies to be found jobs when they arrive, you identify the shortfall and recruit individual soldiers NCOs and Officers for particular roles, which they are then prepared to fill. Over time, they will build up relationships within their host unit, which helps repeat the cycle.

Recruit Officers for individual roles?...! Sorry, I can't get my head 'round this.

6. Manage those returning from deployments. Accept that a number will leave permanently or fail to attend for some time. Thank them for their efforts and make them aware that the CofC understand the need to re-establish themselves back in family/work life, and will welcome them back when they are ready. Make their future prospects clear to them in terms of promotion/jobs/courses. They may not chose to take it, but give them the choice.



7. Maintain operational focus. The "Ops first" mindset is established from weekend one of recruit training. The whole unit should drive towards operational capability at all times. This does not mean removing all of the "fun" elements such as AT/socials/parades etc, but making them secondary to prep for ops. AT/foreign trips is a reward for those who have deployed, with them being given the highest priority for the best fun stuff. If time is tight, lose the add ons, and do a field weekend instead.




4 Para has fully embraced the need to support Ops on an ongoing basis by the provision of IRs to regular Bns as well as FTRS to a number of other units on an ongoing basis. Officers/SNCOs rarely deploy in command of the soldiers they trained. The soldiers want to deploy as IRs, and want to measure themselves against their regular counterparts in the most demanding way possible. Read the TA forum threads for references to the TA being "as good as" or "capable of doing" regular army jobs - the TA soldier wants to prove themself, so let them.

Some leave afterwards having ticked the boxes, others stay for a while, some stay for longer and work their way up the promotion ladder. In short, no real change from how it all worked before, and a damn sight better than the response after mass mobilisations for FP tasks!

Duke, I take my hat off to you - a more coherent and focused post will be hard to find.

Sitting in my high altitude Chinook, I can't help but be impressed by 4 Para's apparent support of the regular Army during it's period of being on a campaign footing. Indeed, you and your unit are the very epitomy of that which the Regular CoC has aspired to for some time. Equally, though my field of vision extends to the broader church of the TA (not just thrusting infanteers) and the line between 'just in case' and 'just in time' has blurred to the point where, as you so eloquently illustrate, can only be managed by committed and able managers at unit level. Were such a model capable of being delivered in a consistent fashion across the organisation, I have absolutely no doubt that the CoC would take it up unreservedly. How you all do all of this with full time demanding careers and families is completely beyond me. The TA would be dead, long live the TA.

My concern is that of a confirmed realist. Despite Dr Evil's support (it is a rare event for him to reappear in this forum), I fear for the remainder of the TA that simply does not, and will not, have the infrastructure you have apparently achieved. I unreservedly take your word that you are 100% recruited but statistics tell only part of the story. Turnover, training wastage rates, etc., can all tell different stories and reveal different aspects of the truth.

However, this is not the issue - you focus is clear and well done for achieving it. The issue is the absence (complete absence) of an Army vision for the TA - one that is clearly articulated, understood by all, and enforced or facilitated accordingly. In the absence of one, you have made your own decisions and thus travel a certain road. Other units, particularly other Arms and Services, have not changed at all, and whilst they manage to support Ops, do so in an ad-hoc and random fashion.

My realist frustration therefore is that the TA does not do what it says on the tin. Indeed, the tin is like one of those after a flood - intact but label-less so no-one knows what's in it until it is opened.

Whilst your actions/process/approach/output/regime (whatever) may be considered by many to be wholly laudable, it is not because of direction or agreement from above, it is in spite of it.

There is very little in the seven key assumptions about to be announced as distilled from the Cottam report that reflects what is going on in 4 Para - good or bad news dependent on one's view - which is an indictment in itself.

I would suggest that for a unit in direct support of current operational requirements, your approach is about as good as it gets. For others, it would be a death knell and thus we ought to be talking about a structure that accommodates both, not one thing at the expense of all others..?

Mr T, apologies in advance for pruning your post to focus on the bits I'd like to reply to: no implication of irrelevance intended, old boy.

Originally Posted by MrTracey

The issue is the absence (complete absence) of an Army vision for the TA - one that is clearly articulated, understood by all, and enforced or facilitated accordingly. In the absence of one, you have made your own decisions and thus travel a certain road. Other units, particularly other Arms and Services, have not changed at all, and whilst they manage to support Ops, do so in an ad-hoc and random fashion.
...

Whilst your actions/process/approach/output/regime (whatever) may be considered by many to be wholly laudable, it is not because of direction or agreement from above, it is in spite of it.

...

I would suggest that for a unit in direct support of current operational requirements, your approach is about as good as it gets. For others, it would be a death knell and thus we ought to be talking about a structure that accommodates both, not one thing at the expense of all others..?

I agree that there is a lamentable absence of direction from the regular Army about what it wants from the TA. Perhaps this is due, in part, to paying too much heed to democracy, or if not that then the political interests of the many stakeholders who have an interest in the TA.

It reminds me a bit of (*yawn*) NHS reform: start off with what sounds like a bright and obvious way of doing things and you're soon involved in a little Vietnam with NHS trusts, local authorities, GPS, consultants, nurses, etc.

But it was ever thus. For the last 200 years or so, the reserves have always just muddled through. It's not an ideal situation, or a justified one, but it's the way it is, so let's just get used to it and crack on.

What I find hard to understand is why there is such resistance from everyone else to the 4 PARA way of making the best of it.

The (non-infantry) unit of which I am a member has been adopting a similar approach. The main difference is that there are no "mobilise or you're a gayer" chats, perhaps because more than enough people are mobilising already from our lot. Otherwise, it's a similar story to The_Duke's and things (quality of training, retention, recruitment, indeed mojo) really do seem to be improving.

What am I missing? Why is the Way of Il Duce the "death knell" for parts of the TA?