
Originally Posted by
GROWNUPS_BEWARE ........................
Chap, you're missing the point. Sadly so is a large proportion of our leadership because they spend most of their time at Staff and not in Command posts....I bash my head against my issue desk because I am suffering the same fate....it comes back to the hallowed word 'capability', and all that lies therein. It takes wise and seasoned men, with backbones of steel, to articulate what won't appear on an excel spreadsheet.
Why are our Infantry so effective? Equipment? You jest. Numbers? Never. Entrance thresholds? Not going by the stories from ATRA. Training? Ah...onto something here, but there's more. It is their FLEXIBILITY and VERSATILITY. How do you take a gang of Cumbrian reivers from preparation for high intensity war to framework patrolling and COIN within a matter of hours, and back again? How do you take a unit in the AI role and give it a PSO tasking and conduct covert surveillance with them all within the same town in Bosnia or Kosovo? This CAPABILITY is found from their collective experience in a variety of infantry roles...and this comes as a result of the Arms Plot. Within an WO/Sgts mess or across the officer spectrum in any inf bn today you will have AI/NI/Mech and light experience which gives a corporate memory not found in other armies. CO of the Black Watch in Telic would agree with me, as would many others. It is this human dimension that is being lost, being unchallenged and glossed over. And when we specialise to role, as FIS will dictate, we will lose that breadth of knowledge - even when mitigated my Individual Posting.
And the great cries of 'that ship has sailed', and 'lets move on' is intellectual idleness. If a suboptimal plan has been made, it is our duty to discuss and debate it. The infantry is being reduced. Battalions are not completing Collective and Individual training to the mandated standards and risk is being taken across the board. Harmony is routinely broken. Our people are not happy. We routinely exceed our defence planning assumptions. We have the TA on the Operational Commitments Cycle....conducting duties they were never designed for, and then we gloss it over by saying we're 'an army to be used'. We've redesigned the 'Future Army Structure' to utilise the 'rule of three' in our brigades, when we know damn well that you need four manoeuvre units to generate a reserve or a pursuit force (for our fourth core function)....And Future Infantry Structures removes the breadth and variety of experience of our re-roling infantry and the strength of tribal cohesion of battalion manning and replaces it with Individual Postings. You might as well be a Gunner. And if you're a Gunner, you might as well be Gay. Finally, we're trading a heavy armoured brigade for a light brigade that is fighting for its existance as a deployable force on the back of a 'medium' capability based on unproven technologies - in short reorganising from 'most difficult' to 'most likely', a serious serious defeat for the forces of reason...because we exist to defend the realm against threats seen and unforeseen.
If I were you, my friend, I would occupy myself with applying that fine brain to the real truth, and the real solutions, of todays complexities, rather than an encyclopaedic knowledge of the party line.
And before you tell me about 'financial realities', spare a moment to consider that in the Eighties and early 90's we were considered the sick man of europe, with an ever dwindling GDP, yet had an army of nearly 200,000. Today we're the worlds fourth richest country, and the planet's oldest democracy, with responsibilities to match, in a more uncertain and more dangerous world. By all means make efficiencies...but not at the expense of 'capability', and our nations security.
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