ARmy Rumour SErvice

Originally Posted by Stonker

I never managed to bottom out the IDF approach.

I don't think even the IDF have either!

Originally Posted by polar

Back on the WW1 topics, has any ever done a study of the different types of empire formations. We're Canadians and ANZACs elite because of the national makeup or was it how their units were made up? I.e. both seemed to give higher rank to reserve/militia officers.

They didn't have a choice seeing as all the Dominions had such tiny regular armies.

Was there a difference in the type of officers regular, militia/reserve or war only units, ie was one limited by training, experience,etc?

No not really.Almost all Dominion troops even at the beginning of the war were hostilities-only or reservists. Though in the ANZAC case quite a few had been through compulsory military training before the war:

http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/com...ary-training/2

The other thing to remember is the Dominion troops were mostly volunteers, in the case of Australia and South Africa, all of them, right until the end of the war. Canada only introduced conscription in 1918 and NZ in 1916. In the case of the Kiwis much of their force were conscripts by the end of the war but with no real drop in quality.

The civvie experience of a fair amount of them as farmers, hunters, outdoorsman of all types really, could have had something to do with their effectiveness.

http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/ph...d-conscription

http://www.cbc.ca/history/EPISCONTEN...2CH2PA3LE.html

EDITED TO ADD:

There were other reasons too for the ANZACs and Canadians ending up as elite corps (they were by no means thought of as such earlier on in the war- like everyone else they learned the hard way). These two papers go into them in some detail. One of the biggest was

Both the Australian and Canadian Corps demonstrated the value of having homogenous corps consisting of fixed divisions and gained strength from that cohesiveness.

They also had some very good or even outstanding commanders- Byng (a Brit) and Currie with the Canadians, Godley, Birdwood (both Brits), Monash and Russell with the ANZACs.

http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/classes/hi1...dn%20Corps.pdf

http://www.scotsatwar.org.uk/AZ/Haig...dresses03.html

Originally Posted by baboon6

There were other reasons too for the ANZACs and Canadians ending up as elite corps (they were by no means thought of as such earlier on in the war- like everyone else they learned the hard way).

Thanks. I will read later.

I was interested that given the similarity in origin between dominion and territorial (volunteers/militia), a average(-) Territorial performed elite breakin of the Hindenberg line by following the example of dominion corps (another reserve formation).
Was the difference in divisions correctly attributed to nationality (British vrs Dominion) or should it have been Regular officers vrs Reserve officers (is also some evidence that territorials performed better than [new] army, following a similar pattern).

Originally Posted by polar

Thanks. I will read later.

I was interested that given the similarity in origin between dominion and territorial (volunteers/militia), a average(-) Territorial performed elite breakin of the Hindenberg line by following the example of dominion corps (another reserve formation).
Was the difference in divisions correctly attributed to nationality (British vrs Dominion) or should it have been Regular officers vrs Reserve officers (is also some evidence that territorials performed better than [new] army, following a similar pattern).

What percentage of British officers were pre-war regulars in 1918? Remember there were over 50 infantry divisions alone in France and Flanders by that time. The Dominions provoided another ten (and the South African brigade). Also most divisions by this time, whether originally regular, New Army or TF, were fairly similar in make-up.

The Dominion divisions and corps never had as severe manning problems as the British ones. They kept the four-battalion brigade while most Brit divs were hard-pressed to man the reduced establishment of three by this time. Also because of their national character it was rare for units or individuals to be posted out of Dominion formations which meant better continuity and teamwork. And yes they had some outstanding officers, most of them militia/reservists.

http://www.1914-1918.net/manpower.htm

The British Armies in France as whole though were pretty good by 1918.

Originally Posted by Gluteus Maximus

To go back a bit to the 'Special Relationship' between us and the Septics. It may have existed for about eighteen months after Pearl Harbour when we were more-or-less equals, and a few months in 1982 based on personal frienship, but apart from that they've been in charge and made the point plain. Consider Yalta and Potsdam and the results thereof...

As for British generals to replace Monty, well Slim for one. Brooke is the obvious choice but was too valuable as a foil to Churchill. Irwin would have been a better army group commander in 1944/45 and as for army commanders: Pope and Gott were the first choices for 8th Army but were killed before taking over; Dempsey actually commanded 2nd Army well when Monty let him; McCreery was at least as good; as might have been Keightley, Hawkesworth or two or three others.

As a 2*, 'Strafer' Gott was a disaster that got lucky: Rommel missing his dumps by yards and 2 NZ Div slogging there way on foot to Sidi Rezegh. Based upon that 'success' he was promoted in rank and reputation FAR beyond his capabilities. He was a decent 1* and that was his ceiling. Moreover, his efforts during Battleaxe managed to get far better generals' reputations trashed. Think Cunningham.

The South African official historian, J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton, wrote of Gott: "It has not been unknown for a commander to pass from disaster to disaster, but it is quite without precedent for any commander to pass from promotion to promotion as a reward for a succession of disasters."

Then there was General Dan Pienaars infamous quote that went something like, "so there is a god after all", on hearing of Gott's death prior to taking command of 8th Army.

Originally Posted by baboon6

The Dominions provoided another ten (and the South African brigade). Also most divisions by this time, whether originally regular, New Army or TF, were fairly similar in make-up.

It was also rare for TF soldiers to be posted out, I'm not aware of conscripts being posted to TF battalions (even though it was possible from 1917, gaps in manning came from the Home Service TF or reserve Bn's). Cross posting of OR's between New Army/regular to/from TF didn't happen although regular officers were posted in.

From the link you mentioned. It made comparisons to the Kitcheners New Army but I'd argue that comparison was flawed. Given that Canadians didn't allow regular officers in and New Army was being formed as an alternative to the TF (against the original Haladane plan of expanding the army based on the TF - which the dominions appeared to follow). Another point, Kitchener distrusted the TF, he wasn't allowed that opinion with Dominion)

It looks as though we have 3 clear different patterns of citizen army/reserves in one Empire army, similar equipment, tactics, 3 different percentages of regular officering and different results? [maybe 4 patterns if you include British supplementary reserves]
With Hammonds plan maybe closer to the New Army approach

Originally Posted by polar

It was also rare for TF soldiers to be posted out, I'm not aware of conscripts being posted to TF battalions (even though it was possible from 1917, gaps in manning came from the Home Service TF or reserve Bn's). Cross posting of OR's between New Army/regular to/from TF didn't happen although regular officers were posted in.

Fair enough but wouldn't most regular and New Army units have had a lot of conscripts by 1918? Also remember when they went to the 3-battalion brigade in early 1918 a lot of units were disbanded and their remaining men sent elsewhere.

From the link you mentioned. It made comparisons to the Kitcheners New Army but I'd argue that comparison was flawed. Given that Canadians didn't allow regular officers in and New Army was being formed as an alternative to the TF (against the original Haladane plan of expanding the army based on the TF - which the dominions appeared to follow). Another point, Kitchener distrusted the TF, he wasn't allowed that opinion with Dominion)

It looks as though we have 3 clear different patterns of citizen army/reserves in one Empire army, similar equipment, tactics, 3 different percentages of regular officering and different results? [maybe 4 patterns if you include British supplementary reserves]

Actually a bit more complicated than that. The Canadians and Australians didn't actually send their equivalents of the TF off to war. Instead they formed new units (numbered battalions), initially at least recruited to a large extent from the militia but also inclding men straight from civvie life and some of their very few regulars. Some officers and NCOs (in 1914) were Boer War veterans who hadn't served since but most had militia experience. Of course as the war went on most new recruits had no previous experience.

Originally Posted by polar

Thanks. I will read later.

I was interested that given the similarity in origin between dominion and territorial (volunteers/militia), a average(-) Territorial performed elite breakin of the Hindenberg line by following the example of dominion corps (another reserve formation).
Was the difference in divisions correctly attributed to nationality (British vrs Dominion) or should it have been Regular officers vrs Reserve officers (is also some evidence that territorials performed better than [new] army, following a similar pattern).

I'm not sure it's quite as tidy as one might wish.

Siegfried Sassoon, for instance, served and was decorated, with 2 R Welch - I think they were (nominally) Regulars. Same Bn had Frank Richards - former Regular, mobilised from the Reserve. By his account (IIRC) that 'Regular' Bn had precious few Regulars - commissioned, non-commissioned or rank'n'file, to speak of by 1917.

It would be a tedious but potentially valuable exercise to use a sampling of the Army Lists of the time to assess the rate and degree of change in the make-up of the officer corps at Bn level as the war rumbled on. I don't know if you could ever directly correlate that demographic shift, to changes in the way the Army thought about and did it's fighting, but I'd be surprised if it didn't suggest some interesting inferences.