Originally Posted by Dunservin

Originally Posted by pombsen-armchair-warrior

Originally Posted by Salvador

We need to spend more of our GDP on Defence making it a priority,

Why? We could just as equally cease operating as a global force and allocate the resource elsewhere.

Isn't it peculiar how most countries would give their eye teeth to be like the UK with one of the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council and all the influence that implies yet there are some in this country who can't wait to throw it away?

spot on.

RE: Green Paper:

Some general comments:

No military in our history has had the perfect capability to foresee and prepare for the "next war." Given this, what our military DOES need to inculcate is flexibility in its thinking, so that it can effectively react and swiftly adapt to changing situations which are, by their nature, impossible to predict. Increasing the intellectual muscle power and flexibility of forces leadership, at the Staff College level and up, may be desireable.

Senior members of the forces also need to be frank with politicians and civil servants, and make clear what can and cannot be done. I am unimpressed by several high-ranking officers who have offered high-profile resignations after tours of Iraq or Afghan. I think it would be more honorable - not to mention a better return on this country's significant investments in their experience and training - for them to stay in and work to effect the necessary changes from within the system, rather than opting out.


RE: Questions:

(1) Given that domestic security cannot be separated from international security, where should we set the balance between focusing on our territory and region and engaging threats at a distance?

I don't see any threat of invasion, or, indeed, of conventional attack, upon the the UK in the near future. Assessing and responding to terrorist threats at home is not military task; it is the responsibility of the civil power, domestic intelligence service and the police. Yes, glamorous chaps in black suits may, indeed, have to abseil onto balconies, but how many times has this happened in the last three decades? Absent a military threat to the homeland, the military is clearly designed for power projection beyond our own borders. (And yes, I'd include NI in that statement.)


(2)What approach should we take if we employ the Armed Forces to address threats at distance?

The approach we have taken for the last several hundred years, bar World Wars: ie fielding a small, highly professional, deployable force that is trained and equipped to fight distant threats, and expects to do so.


(3) What contribution should the Armed Forces make in ensuring security and contributing to resilience within the UK?

Security I have addressed above. I don't see the Armed Force having much role in nation building or disaster relief - merely occassional back up the the civil power, and then only in (by nature, rare) emergencies. Given that we have full-time, professional emergency services, ensuring resilience of the UK is a very, very distant priority for the Armed Forces. The UK is not a third-world country, where only the Armed Forces have the power, the organization, manpower, training and equipment to create or ensure stability. (Well, at least I don't think it is; I have not been home since the summer...)


(4) How could we more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability?

By having clear guidelines pre-deployment. What is our aim in this deployment? Pursuant to that, what is our strategy? Pursuant to that, what are our tactics? What manpower and equipment do we need to do the job? How do we decide when a mission ends - or, in old-fashioned speak, how do we define victory or defeat? The answer to that last question defines when the mission is over and the lads go home or head on to the next deployment. If we had had this check list in hand when we were deployed in Iraq and Afghan...and this check list is hardly rocket sciences...well, would not have suffered humiliation in Iraq, and might (perhaps; this is more arguable) not be in a quagmire in Afghan.


(5) Do our current international defence and security relationships require rebalancing in the longer term?
Should we further integrate our forces with those of key allies and partners?

All relationships require constant adjustments in response to constant and inevitable change. I absolutely think we should integrate our forces further with key partners and allies. If we do this, we no longer have to be jacks-of-all-trades, we can focus on our customary strengths (well-trained, professional personnel; deployability; readiness to go into harm's way) while relying on others to overcome our weaknesses (low numbers; poor equipment; weak logistics/combat support). 'Aha!' you cry, 'But what if we have to fight on our own, what if another Falklands or Sierra Leone pops up, eh?' Well, if we manage the aforementioned relationships appropriately, we can rely on our allies to, if not fight with us, at least support us on those occassions. This is what happened in the Falklands, when the French and the US did the necessary.


(6) To what extent and in what areas should we continue to refocus our current efforts on Afghanistan?

Our duly elected government has seen fit to deploy us there. We are, for better or worse, at war. After the military humiliation of Iraq, our rep as a military power, and - to an extent - our credibility as a nation is at stake. The government should make the decision to:
(a) Support our troops to the hilt, which that will require a recalibration of defense spend, with inevitable knock-on effects on the national budget; or
(b) Set conditions and/or a timetable for our withdrawal, with due consideration for the requirements and expectations of those allies who rely upon us.

Speaking more broadly, politicians should damn well be held to task for what they don't seem to understand: That sending soldiers to war results in deaths. As such, military decision-making has much more significant and immediate consequences than virtually any other area of national policy-making. In this respect, I think US politicians and presidents do a much better job than ours have in the last decade or so: They make clear to the public that when they deploy men, they are deploying them in America's interests, and so will have full support from the public and the best equipment. The Americans learned the first half of this lesson after the Vietnam debacle, but political communication and public commitment re defence is largely absent in the UK.

Originally Posted by Andy_S

I am unimpressed by several high-ranking officers who have offered high-profile resignations after tours of Iraq or Afghan. I think it would be more honorable - not to mention a better return on this country's significant investments in their experience and training - for them to stay in and work to effect the necessary changes from within the system, rather than opting out.

What other means of protest do they really have other that the democratic right to take their labour elsewhere? Surely the military covenant is a two-way process. Do you really think they will ever be allowed to "effect the necessary changes from within the system"? Two hopes - and one of them is Bob.

Originally Posted by PoisonDwarf

Originally Posted by Andy_S

I am unimpressed by several high-ranking officers who have offered high-profile resignations after tours of Iraq or Afghan. I think it would be more honorable - not to mention a better return on this country's significant investments in their experience and training - for them to stay in and work to effect the necessary changes from within the system, rather than opting out.

What other means of protest do they really have other that the democratic right to take their labour elsewhere? Surely the military covenant is a two-way process. Do you really think they will ever be allowed to "effect the necessary changes from within the system"? Two hopes - and one of them is Bob.

I think we need a change of policy. At the moment we insist that public servants have a vow of omerta across the board. I think it is right that we should not be allowed to comment publicly on government policy but I think we should have an obligation to 'whistle blow' when things are going wrong or when politicians are lying.

SNIP
I think we should have an obligation to 'whistle blow' when things are going wrong or when politicians are lying.
SNIP

Some soldiers have - anonymously - gone to media, and a professional media org will respect and defend confidentiality.

However, I still think that officers who truly believe in the role of the armed forces, and are dedicated thereto, should at least ATTEMPT to change thinking, procedures and thinking within the system rather than without it. There is the element of responsibility at work here. Falling on your sword reveals a massive lack of confidence in the military's ability to encompass change, which, incidentally, is a key hallmark of ANY effective organisation.

If senior (let us say, field grade and above) officers only leave in protest after tours of active duty because they are suddenly so disillusioned, it indicates to me that they must have been pretty blinkered in their careers, pre-deployment. Now, if such men admit that they did not, themselves, foresee the difficulties in advance - fair enough. If, OTOH, they resign after saying "I told them this was going to happen; now it has happened; I am out!" - as was the case with the SAS officer who lost a number of men in a vehicle accident last year - it strikes me as closing the barn door after the horse has left. If he had felt so strongly about this potential risk, why did he not offer his resignation before the incident in question?

I'd also suggest that officers need to protest most strongly to the civil service when it is clear that there are life endangering equipment or procedural shortfalls. I hope this is and has been happening, but not being in either of the two systems in question, am in no real position to comment. Either way, would be very interesting to see officers fronting MoD bureaucrats with these deficiencies, and hearing exactly what arguments/excuses the latter come up with. For, unlike other arms of government, decisions made by the MoD can actually result in lives lost.

I'm going to float an idea. Not a popular one, but something that might be worth some discussion.

The SDR will take place against a backdrop of massive fiscal tightening by HMG. Additionally, the legacy of the Iraq War, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, is that the British public whilst supporting the forces have a far smaller appetite for international intervention and the use of force than they have done at any point since Suez, if not since the 1920s/30s.

If I was a chief of staff my contingency plan right now, if I don't get what I want, would be to look at ways of maintaining a 'bottom line' force level from which to regenerate in future.

We know that the Forces will be needed again and again in the future, to do all sorts of things. Politicians and the public don't. Maybe we should be looking at ways of insulating them against the colossal stupidity they are likey to perpetrate.

Thats an interesting idea, I have thought for a while we should maintain a high end core but only at a relatively low quantity to maintain skills etc and then build up from there depending on which way the strategic wind is blowing

Originally Posted by meridian

Thats an interesting idea, I have thought for a while we should maintain a high end core but only at a relatively low quantity to maintain skills etc and then build up from there depending on which way the strategic wind is blowing

The problem is the build up phase and unfortunately potential enemies may not be willing to wait for us to 'regenerate'.

To state, as the Green Paper' does that there are no foreseeable threats is complacency bordering on criminal neglect. How long would it take Russia to destabilise? 1 month? 2? 6? A year? Or can you guarantee it won't happen.

Hmm,

I've been thinking about a number of the things that have been talked about lately... co-operation with France, the nuclear deterrent, the seat at the top table etc...

...is this pointing to a shared nuclear deterrent with France, whilst changing the seat on the top table to "Europe" with it alternating between France and the UK on a yearly basis?

Originally Posted by HVM_Boy

Hmm,

I've been thinking about a number of the things that have been talked about lately... co-operation with France, the nuclear deterrent, the seat at the top table etc...

...is this pointing to a shared nuclear deterrent with France, whilst changing the seat on the top table to "Europe" with it alternating between France and the UK on a yearly basis?

HAHAHAHAHA. No. Given up for good to 'Europe'.

MSR