Thread: The War We Can't Win - Andrew Bacevich (COL, USA, Retired)

Originally Posted by alib

Originally Posted by Monty417

...
Like it or not, that conclusion was not brought about by the UK. The conclusion was brought about by America after 9/11, realising that terrorist attacks are not very nice and ceasing to fund the IRA, and Bush's very world public cold shouldering of scumbag Adams.

This is bollox.

The discussions on the GFA officially began in 92, Canary Wharf was in 96, Omagh in 98, the GFA concluded in 99. To all intents and purposes that ended The Troubles. The pieces of theater that came after the 11th of September 2001 such as the PIRA armistice were largely acts for internal Chuckie consumption.

Neither Clinton nor Bush had much affect on events in the 6C. There are still plenty of Americans eager to help The Ra, they just have to be a little discrete about it these days, as they may get nabbed by the FBI.

Not at all. After the murder of Robert McCartney in Jan 2005 by the IRA, both Bush and Kennedy refused to meet with Adams. The Bush administration strongly urged the IRA to disband. On July 28th 2005, the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign and said that it would work to achieve its aims through 'purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means' and that 'IRA volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever' THAT was the conclusion.

Originally Posted by Monty417

...
Not at all. After the murder of Robert McCartney in Jan 2005 by the IRA, both Bush and Kennedy refused to meet with Adams. The Bush administration strongly urged the IRA to disband. On July 28th 2005, the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign and said that it would work to achieve its aims through 'purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means' and that 'IRA volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever' THAT was the conclusion.

To all intents and purposes the pike went in the thatch at the end of the previous century. By 9-11 as now PIRA's volunteers were living contented lives enlivened only with the odd bank robbery and shooting kids in the extremities. By 05 they were all too fat to fit in their blue overalls.

McCartney getting his throat cut by a bunch or drunken PIRA thugs returning from a Bloody Sunday commemoration did cause a ware of disgust in SF's base. That may have had some impact on the timing, there was a feeling in Belfast that it was finally time IRA to admit it had gone away.

SF/PIRA had dragged its feet in part to stitch up David Trimble. By 05 SF was the dominant Catholic party in the North. Big Ian's hard line DUP had trashed Trimble's UUP on the Prod side. The useful fiction that SF and PIRA were separate entities was falling away.

All politics is local and that applies even more strongly to Chuckiedom.

The fact is The Chuckle Brothers were becoming an inevitable future.


But like the drawn out circus of decommissioning easily replaceable arms the armistice gesture was made so late after the end of the Long War it was nothing but hollow symbolism.

To hear some folk talk you'd think a bloated Boston plutocrat had something like the influence on the peace process of a local actor like Bertie Ahern or even The Pope. This is nonsense. US politicians were marginal figures with walk on parts. The Clinton's much trumpeted role was barely more than Hollywood's celebrity IRA fans and they probably delayed a settlement if anything. After 9-11 and the endless vanity of American statesmen did just barely enter into it but to little affect. SF and a few other wily politicians are clever enough to flatter them that they did make a difference.

Originally Posted by alib

Originally Posted by Monty417

...
Not at all. After the murder of Robert McCartney in Jan 2005 by the IRA, both Bush and Kennedy refused to meet with Adams. The Bush administration strongly urged the IRA to disband. On July 28th 2005, the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign and said that it would work to achieve its aims through 'purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means' and that 'IRA volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever' THAT was the conclusion.

To all intents and purposes the pike went in the thatch at the end of the previous century. By 9-11 as now PIRA's volunteers were living contented lives enlivened only with the odd bank robbery and shooting kids in the extremities. By 05 they were all too fat to fit in their blue overalls.

McCartney getting his throat cut by a bunch or drunken PIRA thugs returning from a Bloody Sunday commemoration did cause a ware of disgust in SF's base. That may have had some impact on the timing, there was a feeling in Belfast that it was finally time IRA to admit it had gone away.

SF/PIRA had dragged its feet in part to stitch up David Trimble. By 05 SF was the dominant Catholic party in the North. Big Ian's hard line DUP had trashed Trimble's UUP on the Prod side. The useful fiction that SF and PIRA were separate entities was falling away.

All politics is local and that applies even more strongly to Chuckiedom.

The fact is The Chuckle Brothers were becoming an inevitable future.


But like the drawn out circus of decommissioning easily replaceable arms the armistice gesture was made so late after the end of the Long War it was nothing but hollow symbolism.

To hear some folk talk you'd think a bloated Boston plutocrat had something like the influence on the peace process of a local actor like Bertie Ahern or even The Pope. This is nonsense. US politicians were marginal figures with walk on parts. The Clinton's much trumpeted role was barely more than Hollywood's celebrity IRA fans and they probably delayed a settlement if anything. After 9-11 and the endless vanity of American statesmen did just barely enter into it but to little affect. SF and a few other wily politicians are clever enough to flatter them that they did make a difference.

While I do not have data as to the extent of US support for the IRA, my perspective (admittedly not from a NE Irish stronghold like south Boston) is that generally the IRA were seen for what they were by most Americans--murdering thugs.

That Alib - what he said: can't disagree, not one iota.

Although I would suggest that at least a part of the paramilitaries decline (on both sides) was influenced by the rave/dance culture that invaded the 6 counties in the late 90s. Suddenly young'uns on both sides were getting loved up on E (when previously both tribal cultures led most youths to alcohol, but away from drugs) and were watching the formerly o-so-anti-drug Provos actually peddling the stuff.

Among young, people, chemically induced lovey-dovey-ness, a creeping contempt for violent hypocritical anachronisms, and the sense that the kind of prosperity that was taking root in a reborn Eire (a state that had finally de-coupled gunmint from religion) was within Ulster's reach - provided the thugs stopped scaring away the investors - played a bigger part in ending the violence than ever did any Septic interloper.

Originally Posted by jumpinjarhead

While I do not have data as to the extent of US support for the IRA, my perspective (admittedly not from a NE Irish stronghold like south Boston) is that generally the IRA were seen for what they were by most Americans--murdering thugs.

I spent a little over four years in the US in the late Seventies/early Eighties. Two of those years were in Chicago and there were an awful lot of RA tin-rattlers around at that time.

My take was that these fellas were peddling the romantic version of the "proper, genuine" IRA (of which my Grandda was a member) from the period just after Were Wore One. The contributors had no way of knowing that they were actually giving dosh to a murderous bunch of fückers who had nothing in common at all with the "real" fellas. There were often confrontations with these tin-rattlers when I questioned their version of things.

I was threatened on more than one occasion when folks, understandably, wanted to hear more from a Mick with the pukka gen about what happened between 1918 and 1922 and what was really going on in the Six Counties.

I can't say the US sympathisers were to blame in any way, but I believe they could've made a bit more effort to learn more about the true situation.

MsG

Originally Posted by jumpinjarhead

Originally Posted by alib

Originally Posted by Monty417

...
Not at all. After the murder of Robert McCartney in Jan 2005 by the IRA, both Bush and Kennedy refused to meet with Adams. The Bush administration strongly urged the IRA to disband. On July 28th 2005, the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign and said that it would work to achieve its aims through 'purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means' and that 'IRA volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever' THAT was the conclusion.

To all intents and purposes the pike went in the thatch at the end of the previous century. By 9-11 as now PIRA's volunteers were living contented lives enlivened only with the odd bank robbery and shooting kids in the extremities. By 05 they were all too fat to fit in their blue overalls.

McCartney getting his throat cut by a bunch or drunken PIRA thugs returning from a Bloody Sunday commemoration did cause a ware of disgust in SF's base. That may have had some impact on the timing, there was a feeling in Belfast that it was finally time IRA to admit it had gone away.

SF/PIRA had dragged its feet in part to stitch up David Trimble. By 05 SF was the dominant Catholic party in the North. Big Ian's hard line DUP had trashed Trimble's UUP on the Prod side. The useful fiction that SF and PIRA were separate entities was falling away.

All politics is local and that applies even more strongly to Chuckiedom.

The fact is The Chuckle Brothers were becoming an inevitable future.


But like the drawn out circus of decommissioning easily replaceable arms the armistice gesture was made so late after the end of the Long War it was nothing but hollow symbolism.

To hear some folk talk you'd think a bloated Boston plutocrat had something like the influence on the peace process of a local actor like Bertie Ahern or even The Pope. This is nonsense. US politicians were marginal figures with walk on parts. The Clinton's much trumpeted role was barely more than Hollywood's celebrity IRA fans and they probably delayed a settlement if anything. After 9-11 and the endless vanity of American statesmen did just barely enter into it but to little affect. SF and a few other wily politicians are clever enough to flatter them that they did make a difference.

While I do not have data as to the extent of US support for the IRA, my perspective (admittedly not from a NE Irish stronghold like south Boston) is that generally the IRA were seen for what they were by most Americans--murdering thugs.

Big population, so of course that is true. I would think that a lot of Americans have no idea or interest in who the IRA were. I was really meaning the Irish American contingent, some of whom, have ancestors with reason to hate the English. I mentioned Kennedy re the IRA disarming in 2005 as he was known over here as an IRA sympathiser with some influence with them. Whatever, someone named Gordon arranged a honorary knighthood for Kennedy, a much despised man by many Irish and many British soldiers.

Sorry to bring this back to Afghanistan but this comment might prove of interest,

"Kabul-based political analyst Fazal Raman Orya says that killing the TTP leader will have a short term positive impact on the security situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region. [2] According to Orya, Mahsud was a main player for Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and was killed at the ISI’s suggestion. “He was very powerful; he had more than 30,000 armed people but sometimes he was not listening to the ISI and was out of their control - that is why they decided to kill him.”

Orya says the ISI will now look for a good replacement and will reorganize the TTP structure. “The truth is that ISI wants to replace him with a new person. The new person will be more powerful than Mahsud but he will always be listening to ISI. Once Baitullah is replaced by the new person I think the situation will become much worse in Afghanistan.”

Link http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35374&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1

As alib said the ISI play a big part in controlling, organising and training Terry on both sides of the border.

Part of the solution in Afghanistan is going to be how to counter the influence of the ISI and give a spine to civilian leadership in Pakistan This of course would form part of the political angle to an Afghan strategy but I keep forgetting the politicians especially in the UK don't have one.

Originally Posted by Bugsy

Originally Posted by jumpinjarhead

While I do not have data as to the extent of US support for the IRA, my perspective (admittedly not from a NE Irish stronghold like south Boston) is that generally the IRA were seen for what they were by most Americans--murdering thugs.

I spent a little over four years in the US in the late Seventies/early Eighties. Two of those years were in Chicago and there were an awful lot of RA tin-rattlers around at that time.

My take was that these fellas were peddling the romantic version of the "proper, genuine" IRA (of which my Grandda was a member) from the period just after Were Wore One. The contributors had no way of knowing that they were actually giving dosh to a murderous bunch of fückers who had nothing in common at all with the "real" fellas. There were often confrontations with these tin-rattlers when I questioned their version of things.

I was threatened on more than one occasion when folks, understandably, wanted to hear more from a Mick with the pukka gen about what happened between 1918 and 1922 and what was really going on in the Six Counties.

I can't say the US sympathisers were to blame in any way, but I believe they could've made a bit more effort to learn more about the true situation.

MsG

I agree. I vividly recall having my eyes opened even wider by a brief from a UK Spl Branch fellow who came to the US in late 70's on a briefing tour of US spl force units. He gave chapter and verse as to the real nature of the IRA and it definitely shattered any notions of romance from earlier times. I still remember thinking they were just a bunch of well-funded organized crime thugs using all the buzz words to maintain their support among the Irish romantics.

Originally Posted by ostvic

Sorry to bring this back to Afghanistan but this comment might prove of interest,

"Kabul-based political analyst Fazal Raman Orya says that killing the TTP leader will have a short term positive impact on the security situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region. [2] According to Orya, Mahsud was a main player for Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and was killed at the ISI’s suggestion. “He was very powerful; he had more than 30,000 armed people but sometimes he was not listening to the ISI and was out of their control - that is why they decided to kill him.”

Orya says the ISI will now look for a good replacement and will reorganize the TTP structure. “The truth is that ISI wants to replace him with a new person. The new person will be more powerful than Mahsud but he will always be listening to ISI. Once Baitullah is replaced by the new person I think the situation will become much worse in Afghanistan.”

Link http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35374&tx_ttnews[backPid]=412&no_cache=1

As alib said the ISI play a big part in controlling, organising and training Terry on both sides of the border.

Part of the solution in Afghanistan is going to be how to counter the influence of the ISI and give a spine to civilian leadership in Pakistan This of course would form part of the political angle to an Afghan strategy but I keep forgetting the politicians especially in the UK don't have one.

I think the pandemic of political spinelessness has arrived here in the US as well.

Originally Posted by ostvic

Part of the solution in Afghanistan . . . .give a spine to [b] civilian leadership in Pakistan . . . but I keep forgetting the politicians especially in the UK don't have one.

Laughed my arrse off, but - feck my old boots - that sentiment is so true it makes me want to weep.

G'DAY all from down under

I have been watching & reading the posts for a few days.
To Jarhead:- SAEPE EXPERTUS, SPEMPER FIDELIS, FRATRES AETERNI

"But Vietnam was an inglorious and ignominious feck up right from the Get Go."

Says who? What is your service/experience against a determined enemy?
Have you spoken to those who Vietnamese who now live in Australia; as they did not want to live under North rule? SO risked everything to get to Australia.

As a Digger who served a 12 month tour with a Battalion, i can attest to the VC and NVA setting up ambushes in Villages friendly to the Government regardless of the effects to the
local population.

A war determined by the world situation at the time; remember Communism at all?

Originally Posted by ozgrunt

G'DAY all from down under

I have been watching & reading the posts for a few days.
To Jarhead:- SAEPE EXPERTUS, SPEMPER FIDELIS, FRATRES AETERNI

"But Vietnam was an inglorious and ignominious feck up right from the Get Go."

Says who? What is your service/experience against a determined enemy?
Have you spoken to those who Vietnamese who now live in Australia; as they did not want to live under North rule? SO risked everything to get to Australia.

As a Digger who served a 12 month tour with a Battalion, i can attest to the VC and NVA setting up ambushes in Villages friendly to the Government regardless of the effects to the
local population.

A war determined by the world situation at the time; remember Communism at all?

Thanks for standing with us so many years ago.

Just a thought.

From =35479&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash=c3914c8b3b]The Concept of Safe Havens in Salafi-Jihadi Strategy on Jamestown by Murad Batal Al-shishani

The search for a "safe haven" in the strategic planning of the Salafi-Jihadi movement is a central issue in the intended establishment of the "Islamic State." The safe haven offers a set of strategic advantages, such as security, training camps, a certain degree of centralization and an easier flow of finances. Recently, al-Qaeda and the Salafi-Jihadi movement have sought to create several "safe havens" instead of relying on just one, as it did in the mid-1990s in Sudan or later in Afghanistan under the Taliban. This paper will examine the geopolitical vision of the safe haven as perceived by al-Qaeda and its importance for the organization.

Al-Qaeda’s Changing Strategies

The Salafi-Jihadi movement, with its al-Qaeda expression, has adopted two types of strategies since the mid-nineties. The first strategy was to gather in one safe haven. Sudan, under its military/Islamist regime, was chosen for this purpose in the 1990s, followed by Afghanistan under the Taliban movement. The camps established in these regions trained operatives who carried out the Riyadh bombings in the mid 1990s, the Mombasa and Dar al-Salaam bombings in 1998, and the 2001 bombing of U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in Yemen.

Since the day the United States started the "War on Terrorism" by targeting al-Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan, dispersing its members and cutting off its funding, al-Qaeda has adapted by decentralizing. Cells based on Salafi-Jihadi ideology were formed to operate according to the local conditions of their countries and upon the instructions of local leaders. This strategy produced confrontations with the Saudi authorities in the period 2003-2006, as well as bombings in Djerba, Bali, Casablanca, Madrid and London.

But in that period, Iraq was considered a safe haven and so emerged the al-Qaeda sponsored "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI). The ideologues of the Salafi-Jihadi movement saw in Iraq not only a place where they could fight the Americans, but also a base from which they could launch attacks on the "near enemy" (the apostate Arab regimes) and liberate Islamic soil. In this regard, Osama bin Laden said, "Know that defending the Muslim countries, especially the Two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, begins by fighting the enemy in al-Rafidain land [i.e. Mesopotamia].” [1] There are also the famous words of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, words which became a popular slogan in Salafi- Jihadi forums, "We fight in Iraq but our eyes are focused on Jerusalem.” [2] For Yusuf al-Ayiri, the late leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (killed by Saudi authorities in 2003), the safe haven meant “a center to attract fighters.” Al-Ayiri wanted to bring fighters from countries bordering Iraq and he gave detailed instructions to fighters on how to go to Iraq and join the jihad. [3]

The Cell System and al-Qaeda’s Islamic State

Two theoretical points of view emerge among Salafi-Jihadist writings regarding the creation of safe havens, even if small in size. The first view is that of Abu Musab al-Suri (a.k.a. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar), one of the most prominent Salafi-Jihadi strategists and ideologues before his detention in 2005 (see Terrorism Monitor, August 15, 2005; September 21, 2006). Al-Suri promoted the idea of a “system,” not an “organization,” meaning that jihadi movements should work according to a system; they should target the close enemy (local regimes) or the far one (United States Israel, India, etc.) in a way that reveals there is agreement over the general aims of the Salafi-Jihadi movements without the need for organizational orders. In other words, these cells should not be part of the organization. [4] This appears to be the approach al-Qaeda adopted after September 11.

The second approach was the one advanced by Abu Bakr Naji, the pseudonym of a regular contributor to jihadi forums. In a book entitled Idarat al-Tawahush (Management of Savagery), Naji stressed the importance of establishing safe havens and said the Salafi-Jihadi movement should have a state or semi-state where they have dominance, or places where Salafi-Jihadis are “empowered” (a term often used by them). From these safe havens they can launch attacks against the Americans and their agents that will inevitably drag the Americans to battle. Naji stressed the importance of launching attacks against the U.S. economy to weaken it. [5]

On January 14, 2009, Osama bin Laden described the new Salafi-Jihadi strategy in managing the battle with the United States in an audiotape recording. Bin Laden adapted Naji’s approach to take advantage of the global financial crisis. The al-Qaeda leader wanted to stress that the movement is still able to keep the conflict going for a long time, saying, “To my nation I say – remembering Almighty God’s grace – rest assured, we feel that God has granted us enough patience to continue the path of jihad for another seven and seven years, if God wishes” (al-faloja.info, January 14). Bin Laden believes that Barack Obama’s administration is in a crisis and thus revealed his movement’s intention to “open new fronts” to exhaust the U.S. economically. In this regard bin Laden says: "Having inherited a heavy legacy [that of U.S. President George W. Bush] and only left with two choices, both are bitter, like someone who swallowed a double-edged dagger - no matter how he [President Obama] moves it will cause him pain. It is most difficult for anyone to inherit a long guerrilla war financed by riba [usury] with a stubborn and patient opponent. If you withdraw from the war you would suffer a military defeat and if you continue your economic crisis will become worse. Obama has inherited not only one war but two and he is incapable of continuing these wars. We are on our way to open other fronts, if God wishes” (al-faloja.info, January 14).

Bin Laden did not specify where the future fronts would be opened but spoke about the existing fronts in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, the Islamic Maghreb and Somalia. It is noted that Somalia and Yemen are among the key fronts where al-Qaeda and the Salafi-Jihadi movement want to establish solid grounds, particularly in light of their diminishing role in Iraq and the growing political role of the Awakening Councils (see Terrorism Monitor, November 7, 2006).

In his analysis, Bin Laden attempts to explain the importance of finding a safe haven for the Salafi-Jihadis. However, the movement as a whole tends to adopt a strategic choice of creating many safe havens, one to replace the other, in a way that would provide the movement’s fighters with places to move to and to continue their war. It should be noted that the areas where the Salafi-Jihadis want to create their safe havens are areas that have internal factors needed for the creation of such refuges (poverty, unemployment, the absence of a state, and poor distribution of resources). These areas also have the needed external factors - the military and security presence of the United States. These factors are the main reason for the existence of the Salafi-Jihadi movement in Yemen, Somalia, the Afghan – Pakistan border region, Central Asia, the refugee camps in Lebanon and, of course, Iraq, according to the changes in political conditions in these countries.

In a work entitled “The responsibility of the People of Yemen regarding the Sanctuary of Muslims,” Abu Musab al-Suri highlighted the geopolitical importance of Yemen as a safe haven from the viewpoint of al-Qaeda and the Salafi-Jihadis, a place from which fighters could launch attacks. [6] The book considered the demographic situation in Yemen as well as the Yemeni people’s strong will and poverty. Yemen’s landscape is characterized by fortified mountains that make Yemen the natural citadel for all the people of the Arab peninsula and the Middle East as a whole. With more than 3,000 kilometres of sea coast and a thousand more kilometres of border running through difficult desert and mountain terrain, Yemen is a potential stronghold for the mujahideen. In addition it has the strategic advantage of controlling one of the world’s most important marine straits, the Bab al-Mandab. Weapons are freely available, given that Yemen is governed by tribal traditions. Moreover, there is the religious factor, with Yemen being associated with a number of prophetic Hadiths and “promises.”

Conclusion

Currently, with the armed confrontations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the diminishing role of al-Qaeda in Iraq, areas like Somalia, Yemen, Central Asia and some African regions might grow in importance for the Salafi-Jihadis. In addition to seeking the creation of safe havens, the jihadis want to expand the number of fronts involving U.S. forces to exhaust America economically. Lastly, the jihadis desire the creation of a number of alternative safe havens in order not to repeat the experience of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks.

My bold. Well that's where the original enemy says it is going. Towards a multitude of bolt holes. FATA is certainly the most significant of these at the moment and I've read elsewhere AQ isn't as cozy there as it once was.

The bit on Iraq is interesting. Takfiri seeing safe havens as “a center to attract fighters”. The Jihad in Iraq as a sort of flanking move directed as much against the near enemy in Saudi and Syria and Egypt as the against the far enemies invasive presence. Well that particular mole has been whacked but Lebanon's Pal camps amongst other places seem to have become a host to this nasty parasite.

Main force really isn't working with these guys and isn't likely too. The argument that we are fighting them over there... simply does not fly if instead we are spreading them around the gap like cop harassed junkies flitting from burb to burb.

Cordesman was on the Diane Rehm show Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Debate and framed his case for a rapid escalation in Afghanistan well. He basically said this theater had suffered from seven years of neglect and the danger of failure in Afghanistan being a collapse in Pakistan. Armed nation building need to be given the chance to succeed but the window is closing fast. He feared Barry would dither just as Dubya did.

I'm skeptical. I would argue a heavy hand north of the Durand also carries that risk. Pakistan certainly looks far shakier than it did seven years ago. The Iraq war became a necessary one to avert a catastrophic regional collapse. A condition created very much by our invasion. I'd acknowledge this one may have become more of the same.

This is the question: are our goals remotely realistic? A centralized democratic Afghanistan isn't remotely realistic in my opinion. A loosely aligned set of provinces weakly ruled from Kabul might be but it is then vulnerable to predatory Lahore. A permanent US protectorate managed by the locals is about the only thing we might slap a label on and call victory and then hope Congress does not pull the air support.

THE VIET NAM WAR THE FACTS!

In Phouc Tuy, the Australian Army never lost a battle, no thanks to the absence of our other SEATO ally, Great Britain, perhaps the underlying cause of the BBC's anti Americanism and its particular attempts to rewrite the results of the Vietnam War. In fact, all American and Allied forces had left South Vietnam by January, 1973, over eighteen months before the fall of Saigon. A peace treaty, the Paris Accords, had been signed by all parties as, to all intents, North Vietnam had been well and truly defeated militarily in the field, despite what years of misinformation would have us believe.


Concurrently, and most germane, was the fragmenting and emasculation of Communist aggression in Asia from the resolute example of America and Australia in Vietnam. The "dominoes" of South East Asia were given a priceless five years to cement their fragile economies and begin to deliver benefits to the people that evaporated the former appeal of Communism. No less an authority than Lee Kuan Yew has confirmed this crucial fact - Vietnam bought the rest of South East Asia the time needed to implement economic and political reform. This was the main game, the defeat of Communist expansion in South East Asia, and we well and truly won it.
Saigon fell because the North Vietnamese broke the Paris Accords, with deliberate and cold-blooded aggression, waiting long enough after Allied forces had left. The Communists attacked with four Armoured divisions across the DMZ in a style reminiscent of Hitler's Blitzkreig. In this new war, the NVA most certainly defeated the numerically inferior South Vietnamese but this was not the American fictional defeat posited by revisionist journalists - the Americans weren't there! If President Nixon had not been emasculated by the 'Watergate' scandal, US Airpower would have been committed to the defence of South Vietnam, however it was withheld by a hostile US Congress.


Finally, another myth is the defeat of US technological might by a bare foot army. The small part played by the Viet Cong against the consistent activities of the very well equipped and numerically superior PAVN forces dismisses the 'barefoot' fallacy. If there was any defeat in the Vietnam War, it was that of the political dimension. This was completely ignored, yet any elementary student (or reporter) of war theory knows, as Klauswitz enjoined, "war is an extension of policy by other means". To focus on technology as the cause of any negative result in that war is a fatal flaw in any argument trying to deduce future directions in warfare.


In the Vietnam War, technology was the equaliser for our forces against a more numerous and well equipped enemy. Helicopters gave flexibility to move less numerous manouvre forces rapidly and productively. Air and artillery support gave them a firepower equaliser when they met these larger enemy numbers. This crucial dynamic of operations in South Vietnam, the technology "equaliser", rarely gets a mention - except as a means of contrasting the combatants in an attempt to reap sympathy for the enemy.


So, when we see the balance bought, at long last, to the realities of the Vietnam War by "We Were Soldiers', the reality of our own military victory, and its long lasting effect on the peace of South East Asia, should also be a part of that balance.

Originally Posted by ozgrunt

THE VIET NAM WAR THE FACTS!

In Phouc Tuy, the Australian Army never lost a battle, no thanks to the absence of our other SEATO ally, Great Britain, perhaps the underlying cause of the BBC's anti Americanism and its particular attempts to rewrite the results of the Vietnam War. In fact, all American and Allied forces had left South Vietnam by January, 1973, over eighteen months before the fall of Saigon. A peace treaty, the Paris Accords, had been signed by all parties as, to all intents, North Vietnam had been well and truly defeated militarily in the field, despite what years of misinformation would have us believe.


Concurrently, and most germane, was the fragmenting and emasculation of Communist aggression in Asia from the resolute example of America and Australia in Vietnam. The "dominoes" of South East Asia were given a priceless five years to cement their fragile economies and begin to deliver benefits to the people that evaporated the former appeal of Communism. No less an authority than Lee Kuan Yew has confirmed this crucial fact - Vietnam bought the rest of South East Asia the time needed to implement economic and political reform. This was the main game, the defeat of Communist expansion in South East Asia, and we well and truly won it.
Saigon fell because the North Vietnamese broke the Paris Accords, with deliberate and cold-blooded aggression, waiting long enough after Allied forces had left. The Communists attacked with four Armoured divisions across the DMZ in a style reminiscent of Hitler's Blitzkreig. In this new war, the NVA most certainly defeated the numerically inferior South Vietnamese but this was not the American fictional defeat posited by revisionist journalists - the Americans weren't there! If President Nixon had not been emasculated by the 'Watergate' scandal, US Airpower would have been committed to the defence of South Vietnam, however it was withheld by a hostile US Congress.


Finally, another myth is the defeat of US technological might by a bare foot army. The small part played by the Viet Cong against the consistent activities of the very well equipped and numerically superior PAVN forces dismisses the 'barefoot' fallacy. If there was any defeat in the Vietnam War, it was that of the political dimension. This was completely ignored, yet any elementary student (or reporter) of war theory knows, as Klauswitz enjoined, "war is an extension of policy by other means". To focus on technology as the cause of any negative result in that war is a fatal flaw in any argument trying to deduce future directions in warfare.


In the Vietnam War, technology was the equaliser for our forces against a more numerous and well equipped enemy. Helicopters gave flexibility to move less numerous manouvre forces rapidly and productively. Air and artillery support gave them a firepower equaliser when they met these larger enemy numbers. This crucial dynamic of operations in South Vietnam, the technology "equaliser", rarely gets a mention - except as a means of contrasting the combatants in an attempt to reap sympathy for the enemy.


So, when we see the balance bought, at long last, to the realities of the Vietnam War by "We Were Soldiers', the reality of our own military victory, and its long lasting effect on the peace of South East Asia, should also be a part of that balance.

Well analyzed and stated. Whenever I concede that "we" "lost" that war, it is by no means a criticism of the usually tactically sound performance of the warriors themselves. Contrary to the obscene propaganda of Platoon etc. and the unforgivable and self-serving accusations of John Kerry et al., they performed in the vast majority of cases with professionalism (especially noteworthy in those days given the largely draftee army) and dogged determination.

The war was lost on the streets of America, in the halls of the White House and the Pentagon and ultimately at the negotiating table.