I much enjoyed Rowland White's 'Phoenix Squadron' so I'd better acquire this too. All credit to those involved.

In the meantime, does 'Vulcan 607' provide any substance to allegations that each Black Buck raid tied up all available air tankers for three days (thus interrupting vital C-130 re-supply flights, Nimrod patrols and Harrier ferry flights) and/or exhausted fuel stocks at Ascension essential for these purposes? I'd like to think not.

Huge resources and huge skill and no little courage expended to no purpose whatsoever and in fact with a measurably negative effect on the campaign. Purely a Crab BS/propaganda stunt.

Originally Posted by seaweed

Huge resources and huge skill and no little courage expended to no purpose whatsoever and in fact with a measurably negative effect on the campaign. Purely a Crab BS/propaganda stunt.

Next week, from the Least-Relevant-Service's propagand-o-meter, how Sharkey Ward is preventing Falklands 2 - The Comeback by flying the FAA's sole FW asset down the Mall for the Diamond Jubilee...................

Whilst it doesn't go as far as to support the comments you make, it does highlight pretty much all of the tanker force (only Victors then) was deployed in support of Black Buck and Nimrod AAR wasn't certified at that time despite having been succesfully trialled so you can make your own conclusions. I'd guess given the fragility of the AAR systems that when a BB mission was planned they drew in the victor beforehand thus limiting AAR for other tasks, BB itself used 1 nimrod, 2 vulcans, 13 victors, 90 aircrew and 1.5 million lbs of aviation fuel to drop 21 bombs. Not too removed from recent efforts to drop 3 storm shadow?

I think the entire victor force at that time was around 23 serviceable a/c, so the 14 at Ascension will have been a big constraint at the time and I'll bet it was a while before they recovered from deploying and thrashing them.

Chasndave - you want any salt & vinegar to go with those chips?

Why all the negativity? It wasn't entirely about denying Stanley's runway to the enemy FJ. It also displayed capability to bomb the mainland, and not least, showed the Soviets we meant business. AND it denied the runway to en FJ - kind of.

Roadster - Why? I think it all goes back to the usual single service george. On the face of it the book is quite open about the Crabs wanting to get into something that was largely the RNs show and they wanted to show they could contribute more than just trucks to Ascension. Defence Reviews always bring out the need for Services to self justify and the Nott review had been particularly savage. There always has been an argument that they (RAF) expended an incredible amount of resource which achieved debatable results at incredibly high risk, but to showcase the RAF or contribute selflessly? I've never seen the FAA view about what the embarked RAF/RN Harriers could have done but I am sure there must have been some debate about launching FRS1/GR3's with bombs against the runway - would that have been a better option, not my bag to answer?

Ultimately there wasn't a credible option of bombing the Argentine mainland, there was no way that realistically would have occurred BUT the Argentinians didn't realise that and so they tied up their assets needlessly protecting their Norther bases so BB did achieve a strategic effect.

I'm not sure much of this was about demonstrating anything to the Soviets?

Originally Posted by seaweed

Huge resources and huge skill and no little courage expended to no purpose whatsoever and in fact with a measurably negative effect on the campaign. Purely a Crab BS/propaganda stunt.

I've said this before, so apologies for the repetition, but that view is not sustained by the available facts - yes, the crabs offered the idea of a raid up to the War Cabinet, and it was taken with no small measure of support from Admirals Lewin, Leach and Fieldhouse, plus buy-in from Adm Woodward.

If it had a 'measurably negative effect', then the three top men in the RN deserve just as much criticism as the crabs. Of course, in the truth, they showed vision regarding ideas of coercive activity, deterrence, signal-sending and keeping the Argentines guessing/ forced to apportion assets for AD of the mainland (yes, not many, but they didn't have many Air-air assets to start with, which is why they continued to fly F-86s throughout the canpaign, even though there was a slight issue with that type shedding wings by that time...). The Argentines had assumed that the Brits were bluffing, and even the despatch of the task force didn't convince them. Having a Vulcan unload 21 x 1000lb bombs over Stanley, followed by elements of 8 Grupo having their arrses handed to them on a plate by suggested that they'd miscalculated somewhat.

No matter what Sharkey Ward says and no matter how eagerly dark blue proponents attempt to write the crabs out of Corporate altogether, the fact of the matter is that the RN leadership saw the Vulcan raid(s) as a means of sustaining pressure on the Argentines and when the RAF offered the option of doing the raid - and it could've been declined, let's not pretend otherwise - the view of the dark blue leadership of the day was 'go for it', fully aware of the implications and the difficulties of getting bombs onto the runway.

Besides all the sidetracking of the refuelling effort, Black Buck required a FLEET AIR ARM combat air patrol for its protection over Stanley which could have been doing useful things instead. There was no chbnce at all a lone Vulcan could have successfully penetrated Argentine mainland air space on its own. What mainly prevented FJ use of Stanley was the shortness of the runway. The Shrike missions were a complete waste as the Args turned their radar off and the Vulcan diversion to Brazil could have caused huge international embarrassment - a Shrike under its wing had PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT painted on it.

(Whoever wrote F86, above .. presumably, wrote he charitably, a typo.) No evidence that air defence resources were reallocated post-Black Buck.

Crikey, didn't mean to set this off. The way the book reads it certainly does suggest CAS et al in the RAF leadership wanted to play the RAF card - and I can understand that. I know there has been debate in the past over the effectiveness/value of the raid what I've not seen is any rationale for why the composite air group couldn't/didn't have a go at the airfield.

The fact that the very threat of mainland raids kept Argentine forces restricted and resources diverted was clearly a superb strategic advantage for UK forces. Was it the right thing to do? Hugely risk, massively expensive in many terms and it delivered an effect - is that quantified as justified? Would we do it again? As I keep on suggesting (with a wink) we appeared to do much the same over Libya - 3 Tonkas, XXXX miles to drop 3 weapons, was that a strategic delivery or single service grand standing (at the time of much CVF faff) - the same could be said of '82 perhaps?

Originally Posted by A2_Matelot

Crikey, didn't mean to set this off. The way the book reads it certainly does suggest CAS et al in the RAF leadership wanted to play the RAF card - and I can understand that. I know there has been debate in the past over the effectiveness/value of the raid what I've not seen is any rationale for why the composite air group couldn't/didn't have a go at the airfield.

The fact that the very threat of mainland raids kept Argentine forces restricted and resources diverted was clearly a superb strategic advantage for UK forces. Was it the right thing to do? Hugely risk, massively expensive in many terms and it delivered an effect - is that quantified as justified? Would we do it again? As I keep on suggesting (with a wink) we appeared to do much the same over Libya - 3 Tonkas, XXXX miles to drop 3 weapons, was that a strategic delivery or single service grand standing (at the time of much CVF faff) - the same could be said of '82 perhaps?

Well, best you read Phoenix Squadron then you can see both sides of the capability tree! I've said it a few times but will say it again, Vulcan 607 is an absolute quality read, as is Phoenix Squadron (Same author), they both cover long range AAR and bombing capabilities, one of RN and the other of RAF therefore complementing each other quite nicely.

I hasten too add, they are both excellent books, riveting whilst full of facts. Hard to believe I know!

Yup, read that and reviewed it for Rum Ration. My next door neighbour is the son of one of the Buccaneer nav's. As you say, quality book.

Originally Posted by A2_Matelot

Yup, read that and reviewed it for Rum Ration. My next door neighbour is the son of one of the Buccaneer nav's. As you say, quality book.

Ha, fair one! Well I think they accompany each other quite well, especially in context of what could have been during the Falklands with the loss of the Buccaneers and Phantoms (Off the top of my head is only 5 years before?). I preferred Phoenix Sqn, it touches on a lot more of the wider situation and in fairness is one of the most exciting starts to a book I have ever read.

Originally Posted by seaweed

Besides all the sidetracking of the refuelling effort, Black Buck required a FLEET AIR ARM combat air patrol for its protection over Stanley which could have been doing useful things instead. There was no chbnce at all a lone Vulcan could have successfully penetrated Argentine mainland air space on its own. What mainly prevented FJ use of Stanley was the shortness of the runway. The Shrike missions were a complete waste as the Args turned their radar off and the Vulcan diversion to Brazil could have caused huge international embarrassment - a Shrike under its wing had PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT painted on it.

(Whoever wrote F86, above .. presumably, wrote he charitably, a typo.) No evidence that air defence resources were reallocated post-Black Buck.

No it didn't. It went in independently, albeit with Sharkey Ward breaking radio silence.

As but one example, a lone Vulcan penetrated US airspace in Ex Skyshield in 1962. The Argentine AD system was - shall we say somewhat less impressive, even 20 years later. Vulcans caused bother to US AD systems during Red Flag in the late 70s in daylight; the idea that a lone Vulcan couldn't penetrate airspace less well defended than the airspace it was designed to penetrate and when it had penetrated airspace defended with kit years ahead of anything (bar, perhaps, Roland) that the Argentines had somewhat underestimates the Vulcan's capabilities, even at the end of its days.

The Shrike missions made the Argentines turn their radar off - that counts as success in SEAD (supression), albeit it not DEAD. No radar = gap in defences. Of course, once the Vulcan went away, then they turned it on again, so it was a very time-limited success. That said, although it's an entirely moot point, had the Shrike gone off 10 metres to the right (or was it left?), then the radar would've been out of action for longer. The second Shrike attack (the one where the Vulcan ended up in Brazil) took out a Skyguard radar, which - given that the 35mm AAA it supported was a tad dangerous doesn't seem to count as an utter waste somehow.

The TPS-43 remained a pain in the arrse - the SHAR and GR3 were unable to go for it with ARMs, but the Vulcans could, which is why they were pressed into service in that role while a very hurried clearance programme for Shrike on the GR3 was conducted (ready for use on 14 Jun 82). To expect a single aircraft of any type, armed with AGM-45 to conduct a Desert Storm/Bekaa Valley like SEAD campaign is really pushing the boundaries of reasonable expectation. The point was that we wanted to go for the radars because they were a pain, and we went for them with what we could - which wasn't enough, and which should've seen SEAD capability brought in for the SHAR , perhaps - a step their Lordships chose not to pursue.

F-86 is not a typo. The Argentines took delivery of about 30 in 1960 and they were still in use in 82, albeit after a number of problems with structural failures; they were very much second line types on the verge of being retired, but they were certainly considered for more widespread use in '82.

And there is some evidence that AD resources were reallocated post Blackbuck, but the Argentine sources (e.g. via Huertas in his interviews with Grupo 8 veterans) suggests that there was concern over Vulcan raids before BB1 - the Express from 14 April 82 had a front cover alleging that Vulcans were being prepared to bomb the mainland, which the Argentines certainly knew about [the headline, not any plan] - so the despatch of the raid on 1 May confirmed their fears that the Vulcan was a player in the war, and they didn't abandon their apportionment of some of their limited assets from AD of Argentina (Huertas, Mirage; The Combat Log, p.120). Indeed, they flew 46 AD missions over Argentina and 45 sorties over the Falklands (Huertas, Op Cit, p.122).

Now - one of the problems they appreciated was the fact that they and the SHAR flew at different altitude bands, and given their lack of AAR, the Mirages couldn't hang around descending to altitude to attempt to engage the SHARs. After 1 May, they were rather wary about attempting to engage at all, as they realised that their weapons systems put them at a disadvantage. The Argentines rightly concluded that the SHAR pilots were of a quality which meant that the Argentines - who thought they were good, and they were [see their Dagger ops, for instance] - weren't going to be able to pull off the 'better pilots in inferior fighters with inferior weapons' trick. I would argue that without forward deploying to the islands (using Stanley as a FOL rather than a FOB), the Mirage IIIs stood little real chance of contesting control of the air. That, though, was not something which could be safely presumed at the time, and since we couldn't be certain that they weren't going to forward deploy in any way shape or form to the islands (and they did take some AM1 matting - see RE Journal 1983 - but not enough), then the Vulcan raids made sense, which is why the Admirals didn't dismiss the option out of hand as a waste of resource. Claims that the Vulcan alone was the reason for the Mirage IIIs not coming up to play are off the mark - but the Vulcan raid on 1 May made a contribution to that.

Originally Posted by A2_Matelot

Crikey, didn't mean to set this off. The way the book reads it certainly does suggest CAS et al in the RAF leadership wanted to play the RAF card - and I can understand that. I know there has been debate in the past over the effectiveness/value of the raid what I've not seen is any rationale for why the composite air group couldn't/didn't have a go at the airfield.

The fact that the very threat of mainland raids kept Argentine forces restricted and resources diverted was clearly a superb strategic advantage for UK forces. Was it the right thing to do? Hugely risk, massively expensive in many terms and it delivered an effect - is that quantified as justified? Would we do it again? As I keep on suggesting (with a wink) we appeared to do much the same over Libya - 3 Tonkas, XXXX miles to drop 3 weapons, was that a strategic delivery or single service grand standing (at the time of much CVF faff) - the same could be said of '82 perhaps?

A2M - sorry about that...

You're quite right that White makes the point about the RAF being eager to be involved, but I think - in part based upon talking to/listening to the people involved at the time - that he overplays the 'we simply must use the Vulcan or we'll be irrelevant' card. I suspect that AOC 1 Group (Knight) may have pushed that line, but the CAS was far more sanguine about the effect Vulcan could achieve.

In many respects, the (spurious) argument which could've been pushed by the light blue was that the deployment of 1(F) Sqn and the success of the RAF pilots who flew the SHAR demonstrated that you didn't need a separate FAA, etc (not true and not argued) and that you couldn't rely on former naval aviators to use air assets properly (er... sadly a hint of truth there borne out by both dark and light blue who were there at the time). Vulcan was on the way out, overdue for replacement and a last grand hurrah during Corporate wasn't going to do anything to save the Vulcan, or protect the Tornado GR procurement, or save the RAF. The crabs could point to the importance of the airbridge, AAR, the loan SHAR pilots, the MPA, the lone Chinook and the Harriers of 1 Sqn (indeed, Julian Thompson is on record as saying that the Harrier strike there turned the course of the battle). The problem is that the Vulcan raids, especially the first, captured the imagination and you ended up with a number of authors - far from all of them being light blue - making claims for BB1 that are excessive, claims which some in the RAF took at face value in a bid to counter the equally over-the-top critique made by Sharkey Ward who didn't get the rationale for the raid and concluded that it must illustrate his long-held beliefs about the crabs rather than anything else...

As for Ellamy, I think we delivered rather more than three Storm Shadow. One of the reasons SS was used (apart from the fact that it can do things TLAM cannot) lay in the fact that it could be launched against targets which were beyond the easy (relatively speaking) reach of CSAR, thus reducing risk by removing the need for an aircraft overhead delivering a weapon.

Archimedes - Wrt Ellamy, I'm referring to the long legs Tonka missions conducted before they moved a/c to the Agricola airbase. I understand the rationale to use Storm Shadow, but the targets attacked (from what I have been told) would still make the necessity to launch a raid of that type unnecessary as a TLAM would have sufficed. Oddly coincidental that all this occurred as the "you need one/you don't need one" debate occurred with regard to CVF. Without drawing anyone else in to the debate or saying too much, a sunshine avert colleague who was out there was quite disappointed they didn't get to release more toys. I can only make an assessment on what I hear. None of the Services is backward in putting themselves forward at the expense of the others when they can, we still don't play nicely together.

I still think the BB raid is fascinating. It could all so easily have unravelled - HDU failure, AAR probe shearing off, another window seal, nav failure, even loss of the a/c due to enemy fires. The mission was built upon sand yet it succeeded, great stuff when you get away with it. Could make a good film!

Originally Posted by A2_Matelot

Crikey, didn't mean to set this off. The way the book reads it certainly does suggest CAS et al in the RAF leadership wanted to play the RAF card - and I can understand that. I know there has been debate in the past over the effectiveness/value of the raid what I've not seen is any rationale for why the composite air group couldn't/didn't have a go at the airfield.

The fact that the very threat of mainland raids kept Argentine forces restricted and resources diverted was clearly a superb strategic advantage for UK forces. Was it the right thing to do? Hugely risk, massively expensive in many terms and it delivered an effect - is that quantified as justified? Would we do it again? As I keep on suggesting (with a wink) we appeared to do much the same over Libya - 3 Tonkas, XXXX miles to drop 3 weapons, was that a strategic delivery or single service grand standing (at the time of much CVF faff) - the same could be said of '82 perhaps?

Some salt & vinegar with THOSE chips, A2??

The constant nipping & sniping at the nasty Crabs (boo hiss) by some sections of the RN and their acolytes is viewed with some humour in the Light Blue; that's all. Boils down to the fact (IMHO, at any rate) that as the RN downsize and lose capabilities they look outside their Service for someone to blame (heaven forbid they conduct any self-examination- Nelson, 300 years of tradition, rum, bum & baccy etc etc etc), and so in the field of aviation they look at the Crabs. It MUST have been a stitch up by the Light Blue; we're PERFECT in the RN, dontcha know.........??

Take the Harrier as a case in point. When FA2 folded (not because they were f***ed, but because the nasty Crabs errrrm, right, they internally reorg-ed Strike Command to manouevre round the plucky Fleet Air Arm, and then they held Des Browne's wife & kids hostage, right, till the SHAR was binned - and that's true.........) we made seats available on the GR7/9. An oppo of mine from a Staff Course years ago was on 1 Sqn at the time and his opinions were FAR from complimentary, to put it mildly.

You want grandstanding = trumpeting their bilge about JOINT Force Harrier (30% RN manning at best I think) and the Naval Strike WING (errm, that's what is commonly referred to as a Squadron.......)

And as for the "CVS could've done a MUCH better job on ELLAMY" argument pumped by the likes of Ward & Lewis Page (and some pretty senior RN types) - give it a rest. The world has moved on, and you don't have those toys any more. Bet that's the fault of the Crabs as well, eh.....?????

I could go on, but I shan't. The FAA can nip & snipe away at the Air Force all they like; no-one cares.

As I said...

Who's nipping and sniping - my comments are restricted largely to the value/aim of BB considering the challenges, difficulties and risk; and a parallel I see with the Ellamy strikes, which I find interesting. Raised solely from my reading this book!

If I wanted to discuss the RAF and how it widens it grip on interesting posts/capabilities at the expense of the other two services I would, there's a lot there to discuss (and in some ways admire).

You cannot deny, at times the single Services do things because they CAN not because they should and all to achieve a self serving aim.

Clearly you're not a fan of the RN, that makes us sad. Come to the next CTP,we'll send a car!

CnD - you're being unfair to A2M there. He's not making any Pagean/Wardian arguments, but raising the question of why Storm Shadow appears to have been used in greater numbers than TLAM when some of the target sets might have been engaged by either system. From what I've gathered, the rationale behind this wasn't to do with the RAF hogging the limelight; however, since I gathered this at a brief which was classified at a 'Not To Appear on Arrse or PPrune, please' level, I think I'd best leave it there...

Hmmm, extensively researched ?

Nobody came and talked to me about the show.......

If they had I could have told them of how we managed to call-off the French when they launched their air defence Mirage jets against the bombers prior to the raid when they were doing the air-to-air refuelling trials 300 miles off Lands End away from prying eyes, and the Vulcan and Victor tankers strayed into French airspace unannounced.

I bet that's not in the book.

This was all very hush-hush at the time and we weren't allowed to talk about it with even with our colleagues, as nobody was supposed to know about Vulcan bombers with an air-to-air refuelling capability, although I've always suspected the Mirage pilots saw exactly what was going on but the word never got out until the actual raid.

Black Buck One - Out