Thread: Afghan fighting - the latest reports.

Originally Posted by Skynet

U.S. not expecting quick Afghan troop hikes by allies
Tue Nov 24, 2009 9:54pm GMT Email | Print | Share | Single Page
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. allies will likely wait weeks before deciding whether to send more troops to Afghanistan rather than responding immediately to President Barack Obama's coming announcement on U.S. forces, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

"I don't think there's an expectation that you're going to see a bunch of nations standing up in rapid succession and declaring their intention to add large numbers of additional forces right away," said Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell.

"I think this is something that will likely take ... several weeks, probably, to come to fruition."

After three months reviewing Afghan war strategy, Obama is expected to make a prime time announcement next Tuesday about the way forward in the face of rising casualties, fading public support and a resurgent Taliban.

Influential voices in Obama's national security cabinet, including Defence Secretary Robert Gates and military chiefs, favour a U.S. troop increase of 30,000-plus, officials say. The final number could reach 35,000 or more with U.S. trainers.

Other White House advisers have pushed to keep the total number closer to 20,000 with a sharper focus on training Afghan security forces, officials said.

A big question is whether NATO contributions could lift the final number closer to the 40,000 troops sought by the top U.S. and NATO commander on the ground, General Stanley McChrystal.

"If indeed, we add more forces it would be expected that our allies would find a way to do the same. And I'm sure appropriate conversations would be had with them about what they can do and when they can do it," Morrell said.

Morrell said "maybe we'll see something" on new troop commitments at a NATO conference on troop levels on December 7. But he said many allies might wait until a European conference on Afghanistan expected to take place in late January. Continued...

We can all but hope for such a spouse--quite a dignified and well spoken lady.

Talking with the Taliban: Easier Said Than Done
By Aryn Baker / Kabul

Abdul Jameel was ready for peace. The commander of a small group of Taliban fighters in the province of Wardak, Afghanistan, Jameel was able to persuade his men to surrender to the government in exchange for amnesty and the chance to return to a life of farming or shopkeeping. But he never got that chance. Just weeks after he approached the government, Jameel and several members of his family were gunned down. It is unclear if the Taliban killed him or if old rivals were seeking revenge. Nevertheless, Jameel's story — which quickly spread around the province — provided a potent deterrent to other would-be reconcilers and a lesson in the complexities of talking with the Taliban.

As Afghan President Hamid Karzai embarks on his second five-year term, he maintains that his primary agenda is to bring the war in Afghanistan to a peaceful close through negotiations with members of the Taliban insurgency. Karzai has gone so far as to invite his "Taliban brothers" to "embrace their land" and join him in talks. The U.S. too is growing weary of the war. As President Barack Obama finalizes his new strategy for Afghanistan and deliberates over how many more troops he should send to the front, he is facing pressure to define a clear exit strategy. What was once anathema — talking to an enemy that was overthrown by U.S. forces in 2001 in retaliation for sheltering Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network — is now gaining acceptance, as the generals realize that military tactics alone will not win this war. For many U.S., European and U.N. diplomats as well as Afghan officials, talking with the Taliban seems to be the fastest, and perhaps only, way out of the quagmire. (See pictures of the battle against the Taliban.)

Is it really? Or is a dialogue with the Taliban just another dead end?

For those who think that negotiations are worth trying and that so-called moderate Taliban can be coaxed to break ranks with their extremist leaders, there is a hopeful precedent. Starting in early 2007, tens of thousands of Iraqi insurgents were persuaded to lay down their weapons in exchange for cash and jobs, usually as part of local militias fighting their former al-Qaeda allies. Building on that example, General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander of international forces in Afghanistan, wrote in his recent assessment of the Afghan war that NATO "must identify opportunities to reintegrate former mid- to low-level insurgent fighters into normal society by offering them a way out." Lieut. General Graeme Lamb, a former head of Britain's special forces who was asked by McChrystal to head the program, which was announced in September, says insurgents need to be offered security, vocational training, jobs and amnesty for past crimes. "This is not rocket science," says Lamb. "Insurgents have been reconciling and reintegrating back into society for centuries. This is about entering a dialogue where they can see opportunities, because the way you counter an insurgency is with a better life." (See pictures of the U.S. Marines' offensive in Afghanistan.)

Both Afghan and Western officials have embraced the new terminology: they seek reintegration for low-level Taliban members who are assumed to be fighting for money or personal grievances, and reconciliation for Taliban leaders who are motivated by ideology. The plan, according to U.S. officials, will be undertaken in concert with the Afghan government. "We think that reintegration, if done right, if done by Afghan leaders and people, helps to create conditions for broader-scale reconciliation," says a U.S. diplomat.

The Taliban leadership, needless to say, has greeted all this with a snort of derision. "The mujahedin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are not mercenaries," said Mullah Brader Akhund in a statement. "This war will come to an end when all invaders leave our country and an Islamic government based on the aspirations of our people is formed." Such a denunciation was to be expected. But even those who back the plan worry that Karzai's corruption-riddled government is so detested that money and jobs will not be enough, on their own, to woo fighters to switch sides. "Paying the low-level [Taliban] may work temporarily, but it won't solve the main problems," says Ishaq Nizami, the former head of the TV and Radio Directorate under the Taliban regime. "There is so much corruption and no laws. In many areas the Taliban have been able to bring security and justice, which the government has not done. Even if some fighters turn, they will turn back again when they understand that their lives are not better." For reintegration to work, in other words, Afghanistan needs to have a government worth fighting for. So far it does not.

See pictures of suicide in recruiters' ranks.

See pictures of Osama Bin Laden.

You Can't Help if You Aren't There
Persuading fighters to think of laying down their arms might be the easiest part of a new approach. They also need to believe they will be safe if they do so. Many Taliban foot soldiers joined the movement simply because they ended up on the wrong side of a local power equation. As with Jameel in Wardak province, affiliation with the Taliban offered them protection. So if they are going to disarm, they need to be confident that the side they are joining will stay and win — otherwise, desertion could be a death sentence.

Trouble is, that means making the sort of guarantee that the U.S. and its allies shy away from. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently that the U.S. is "not interested in staying [in Afghanistan]" and has "no long-term stake there," she probably — if inadvertently — caused fence sitters to reconsider their options. Indeed, Masoom Stanekzai, Karzai's point man on the reintegration policy, says that for it to work, a U.S. commitment of more troops is important. "The stronger presence of security forces in an area means that more Taliban commanders are under pressure," says Stanekzai. "They will ask themselves, 'Continue and be killed, or join the peace process?'" (See who's who in Barack Obama's White House.)

So far, the new policy has focused on low-level Taliban fighters. But there have been moves to engage the insurgency's leaders too. In a sign of mounting frustration with Karzai's government, Obama recently requested an analysis of Afghanistan's provinces to determine which of them had leaders with whom the U.S. could work directly. The request apparently did not exclude Taliban commanders, a move that has met with approval among Afghans. "There are many capable people in the Taliban ... [who] can be an asset [to the government] if they agree to lay down their arms," says Haleem Fidayee, governor of Wardak province. To many, the Taliban are no worse than the warlords who preceded them in power. Several such warlords are now serving in Karzai's Cabinet. If they can be brought into the tent, the reasoning goes, why can't the Taliban leadership? "If you want to get important results, you have to talk to important people," says Talatbek Masadykov, director of political affairs at the U.N.

But do those important people want a conversation? In recent months, Mullah Omar, the one-eyed veteran Taliban leader, seems to have distanced himself from al-Qaeda. In a September statement, Omar assured foreign nations that Afghanistan would never again be used as a launching ground for international terrorism, as it was before 9/11. "We assure all countries," he said, "that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause jeopardy to others." Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network and author of a recent book on the war, is convinced that the Taliban is trying to send a message. "They are presenting themselves as a parallel government. Even before 9/11 they wanted to play ball. We didn't take them seriously then, but we should start doing that now." (See what happened to the accused 9/11 plotters.)

Others might dispute that analysis. In 2001, the Taliban leadership was fractured between moderates, who sought international engagement, and conservatives, influenced by al-Qaeda, who preferred continued isolation. But assuming that at least some Taliban leaders want to reach out to the West, what would a conversation with them be about? "Everyone says we have to talk to the Taliban," says Hekmat Karzai, director of the Kabul-based Center for Conflict and Peace Studies. "But when you do, what the hell are you going to say?" It's a good question. The first thing the Taliban would want is a cease-fire, says Antonio Giustozzi, author of Decoding the New Taliban. "They crave the kind of legitimacy that such a cease-fire would bring. They want to be counted as a legitimate force with legitimate grievances." But a cease-fire would mean that Taliban senior leaders would be removed from the U.N. sanctions list as well as the Pentagon's Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List, which catalogs authorized targets for U.S. forces. Doing so shouldn't be that difficult. It could even be used as a bargaining tool to lure some of the Taliban to the table.

See pictures of a Jihadist's journey.

See who's who on the CIA payroll.

The al-Qaeda Connection
Other key Taliban demands will be less easy to meet. In any negotiations, for example, the Taliban would want to see a timeline for the withdrawal of international forces. The problem there, Hekmat Karzai says, is that "Afghans know that if the international soldiers leave we won't have a solid security institution, so foreign withdrawal has to be concomitant with increased Afghan security forces." But training of the Afghan army and police force is going more slowly than planned, and U.S. and European instructors are in short supply. It will be several years before Afghan troops can defend the country on their own. Before it withdraws its forces, the U.S. will want to be sure that all al-Qaeda bases have been destroyed and that the group will not be able to use Afghanistan as a launching pad for further terrorist attacks. In theory, that is doable. Intelligence officials estimate that there are fewer than 100 al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, but for the Taliban to completely renounce their al-Qaeda sponsors, says Giustozzi, they will have to be provided with alternative sources of income. (See more about the Taliban.)

Even if Saudi Arabia or others stepped into the financial breach, not all Afghans are convinced that the Taliban leadership can be easily peeled away from al-Qaeda. A senior Afghan security official points to a recent attack on the U.N. compound in Kabul that was planned and financed by al-Qaeda but executed by the Taliban. The war has brought their causes closer together, he says. "Now the real Taliban is no different from the real al-Qaeda. They are not a bunch of hungry guys fighting because al-Qaeda is paying them. They will never accept our vision of a stable, democratic Afghanistan."

That rejection extends to Western demands for Afghan women to have basic rights. Listen to Abdul Wahid, 26, a Taliban member jailed for his involvement in a car-bomb blast that claimed several lives. Wahid says compromise on the establishment of Islamic law is out of the question — and to him, that means women would not be able to work. "They could leave the house, but only if they were dressed appropriately. They could go to school, but they would never be able to work in offices — only in women's hospitals or as teachers at girls' schools." If the Obama Administration were willing to negotiate with the Taliban in the hope of a quick exit, such issues would not just create outrage at home; they would disillusion those Afghans who still believe in Western promises of human rights and democracy. "Afghans don't really want reconciliation," says the Afghan security official. "They are not prepared to have the Taliban return. They are desperate to come to an end of the fighting — that is all."

So too is the U.S. And that is why Hekmat Karzai sees the enthusiasm for talks less as a considered proposal for a long-term Afghan solution and more as a way for the U.S. and its allies to get out as soon as they can. "If we are going to initiate dialogue, it should not be so the West can immediately leave Afghanistan, saying, 'Look, now they have come together. They have developed a solution Afghans are happy with, so we can back off.' If you did that, this country would collapse back into chaos. We have to do this because we want to make sure there is a lasting peace."

Talking to the Taliban, on that view, will work only if it is accompanied by an extensive nation-building program, leading to a clean government that protects its people and gives them real opportunity. Pity that is precisely the long-term commitment to Afghanistan the U.S. is trying to avoid.

http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,...940679,00.html

Surge Targets Taliban Bastion

U.S. to Concentrate Extra Forces in Kandahar Region; New Strategy on Tap Next Week


KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- Commanders in Afghanistan say they will devote the majority of the fresh troops expected from the White House to securing the country's troubled south and will especially target this volatile city, the Taliban's main power base.

U.S. President Barack Obama will announce his revamped war strategy in an address to the nation early next week, likely Tuesday. He is widely expected to adopt a plan that sends between 20,000 and 40,000 more troops to bolster a flagging military campaign and the 68,000 U.S. troops now fighting it.

But even before Mr. Obama takes his case to the public, military commanders on the battlefield are ready to implement a plan that makes a defensive ring around Kandahar a linchpin of the fight to come. No matter how many troops the president decides to authorize, the Kandahar campaign will be an early, large-scale test of U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan of refocusing allied military, political and economic efforts on population centers and away from sparsely peopled rural areas.

The new commander of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, and his staff detailed how they will put the McChrystal approach into action, in interviews with The Wall Street Journal: They plan to mass thousands of troops now scattered around the south and pack them into a tight cordon around the outskirts of Kandahar city.

At the same time, the coalition plans to pour economic, police and political assistance into the urban core to try to persuade residents that the Afghan government serves them better than the Taliban alternative. "We have to regain the initiative, and we have to get some momentum going," said Gen. Carter.

As Gen. McChrystal's team scrambles to reverse Taliban gains in Kandahar, they will also dispatch thousands of American soldiers to secure the major highways that pass through the city to Pakistan and elsewhere in southern Afghanistan.

As soon as this weekend, officers expect to order the fast-moving armored Stryker Brigade to devote itself full time to securing roads plagued by hidden bombs and illegal checkpoints run by insurgents, bandits and corrupt police.

Commanders say the Kandahar campaign will force them to pull troops away from less-urgent fights. "There's no slack out there," said U.S. Brig. Gen. Frederick "Ben" Hodges, director of operations in the south. "Additional forces -- I need them big time. I can't dominate all of the places I want to dominate."

Thousands of troops also would likely be deployed to expand the Kandahar approach to the most densely populated districts of the Helmand River Valley in neighboring Helmand province. Together, the two areas contain about two million of the estimated three million residents of southern Afghanistan.

The new southern strategy is an explicit recognition that a move this past summer to position a few thousand Canadian and U.S. troops outside Kandahar failed to stop insurgents from infiltrating the city.

For years the coalition paid little attention to the city, despite a huge allied presence at the airfield outside town. That neglect allowed the Taliban, whose Islamist movement was born in Kandahar, to again make inroads.

Insurgents have intimidated residents with threats and bombings and set up rudimentary courts to adjudicate local disputes -- a direct challenge to the government's right to control the instruments of justice.

Gen. McChrystal's urban strategy has its detractors, among them Arturo Munoz, a senior political scientist at Rand Corp. "Retreating from rural areas to focus on populated areas would put us in the same position as the Russians at the end of their failed campaign" in Afghanistan a generation ago, Mr. Munoz wrote in an email. "They held the cities, but the insurgents held the countryside. If we cannot engage the enemy in the countryside, then we have lost already."

But allied and Afghan officials say Kandahar is too crucial to lose. "The history of Afghanistan always was, always is and always will be determined from Kandahar," provincial Gov. Tooryalai Wesa said in an interview.

The city is a crossroads on trade routes to Pakistan. The Taliban came to power in the 1990s in part on the strength of their ability to make the roads safe for travelers and truckers. They were toppled by the U.S.-led invasion after the 2001 attacks on America.

Now insurgents, common criminals and corrupt police officers set up illegal checkpoints along the highways. Allied officials say such insecurity has crippled the local economy and that Gen. Carter's plan to protect roads is central to establishing credibility for the government and the coalition.

The Stryker Brigade will have road engineers and intelligence teams on board, and will likely use high-tech surveillance equipment to try to ensure that insurgents don't plant explosives or extort money from passersby, officials say.

For security reasons, allied officers don't want to publicize how many soldiers will be involved in the Kandahar operation. They say their plan will boost the troops encircling Kandahar by 50%, while reducing the area they cover by 90%, making the cordon harder for insurgents to penetrate.

Gen. Carter is wary of inserting large numbers of foreign troops into the center of Kandahar, an ethnically Pashtun city in a Pashtun insurgency. There is a small Canadian security and economic-aid team inside the city and a 150-man U.S. military-police company. Gen. Carter plans to boost that with another small MP unit to bolster the Afghan National Police.

The Taliban's influence in the city is so pervasive that the Afghan police are often too frightened of kidnapping and assassination threats to move about the city freely, especially at night. One precinct commander refuses to go downtown from his station house unless accompanied by five armed patrolmen. "The Taliban would kill me," said the commander, Lt. Col. Abdul Qader.

One of Gen. Carter's priorities is to persuade local political authorities to organize a Kandahar council of tribal elders, or shura, to help guide the city and make peace with insurgents amenable to reconciliation. In Afghan culture, such institutions are used to resolve disputes.

The coalition also plans to flood Kandahar and its environs with economic aid, including a $50 million Canadian irrigation system, a U.S. farm-and-jobs project and a new electrical-distribution network expected to cost some $20 million.

The economic surge is intended to generate employment and address festering complaints that the Karzai government and its international backers cannot provide a better life for Kandahar residents.

President Obama met most recently with his war council on Monday to discuss his troop plans, in the first such meeting since just before his nine-day trip to Asia. On Tuesday, he told reporters at the White House: "After eight years -- some of those years in which we did not have, I think, either the resources or the strategy to get the job done -- it is my intention to finish the job."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1259...DDLETopStories

2.5 tons explosive device seized in E Afghanistan
www.chinaview.cn 2009-11-25 14:42:31 Print
KABUL, Nov. 25 (Xinhua) -- Security forces seized 2.5 tons of explosive device from a vehicle in Laghman province in the east of Afghanistan and thus foiled a deadly terrorist attack, a local newspaper reported Wednesday.

"Personnel of law enforcing agencies during patrol intercepted a car and found 2,500 kg explosive device planted inside it," daily Arman-e-Millie reported.

The militants, it added, attempted to detonate the device and harm people.

A deadly car blast in Laghman province couple of months ago left over a dozen people dead including deputy to intelligence agency Abdullah and injured scores others.

Taliban militants fighting Afghan government often use roadside bombings and suicide attacks to destabilize security in the war-torn country.

Kandahar — Key city in Afghan war

Wednesday, 25 Nov, 2009

The fight for Kandahar shows some of the biggest hurdles faced by the US as it tries to implement a strategy of winning over the ordinary people of Afghanistan. — Photo by Reuters

KANDAHAR: A wedding was called off because international troops killed the groom. A suicide bomber blew himself up in front of a police patrol. An old woman was beaten by the Taliban after she tried to stop them from taking her son. And all of this happened in just two weeks in the same place _ Kandahar.

The fight for Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, shows some of the biggest hurdles faced by the US as it tries to implement a strategy of winning over the ordinary people of Afghanistan.

Kandahar, a city of an estimated 800,000 people in the south, is an important piece in the battle for Afghanistan, and losing control of it would be a huge blow to the coalition. Yet by some accounts, including that of military officials, religious insurgents already control most of the 17 districts in Kandahar province. Kandahar was the headquarters of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and the presence of Taliban there is growing.

The outgoing Nato commander for southern Afghanistan told The Associated Press that troops need to secure the exits and entrances to Kandahar city itself if the provincial capital is to be protected from infiltration and an eventual Taliban takeover.

‘Will Kandahar fall? Every two or three weeks people tell me Kandahar will fall. I think the way forward is to secure the approaches to Kandahar city,’ said Dutch Maj. Gen. Marc C. De Kruif.
More
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...han-war-hs-09?

Originally Posted by Skynet

Kandahar — Key city in Afghan war

Wednesday, 25 Nov, 2009

The fight for Kandahar shows some of the biggest hurdles faced by the US as it tries to implement a strategy of winning over the ordinary people of Afghanistan. — Photo by Reuters

KANDAHAR: A wedding was called off because international troops killed the groom. A suicide bomber blew himself up in front of a police patrol. An old woman was beaten by the Taliban after she tried to stop them from taking her son. And all of this happened in just two weeks in the same place _ Kandahar.

The fight for Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, shows some of the biggest hurdles faced by the US as it tries to implement a strategy of winning over the ordinary people of Afghanistan.

Kandahar, a city of an estimated 800,000 people in the south, is an important piece in the battle for Afghanistan, and losing control of it would be a huge blow to the coalition. Yet by some accounts, including that of military officials, religious insurgents already control most of the 17 districts in Kandahar province. Kandahar was the headquarters of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and the presence of Taliban there is growing.

The outgoing Nato commander for southern Afghanistan told The Associated Press that troops need to secure the exits and entrances to Kandahar city itself if the provincial capital is to be protected from infiltration and an eventual Taliban takeover.

‘Will Kandahar fall? Every two or three weeks people tell me Kandahar will fall. I think the way forward is to secure the approaches to Kandahar city,’ said Dutch Maj. Gen. Marc C. De Kruif.
More
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/...han-war-hs-09?

It is always possible for an insurgency to take a city. The Warsaw uprising and Hue proved that. Unfortunately, that then takes away the insurgents key advantage, of mobility and disappearing into the main population. All it provides is a quick propaganda victory, followed by annihilation.

The Taliban may be banking on the kind of morale collapse in the USA that took place after the Tet offensive, which militarily was a bloody disaster for the Vietnamese. The drawback is that a huge FIBUA operation to retake the town will involve heavy civilian casualties.

Originally Posted by HectortheInspector

It is always possible for an insurgency to take a city. The Warsaw uprising and Hue proved that. Unfortunately, that then takes away the insurgents key advantage, of mobility and disappearing into the main population. All it provides is a quick propaganda victory, followed by annihilation.

You might want to make the same comparison, but with 1971 Londonderry and Belfast in mind. The IRA had seized chunks of those cities, and were trying to keep them outside the rule of Westminster. A massive influx of troops (op MOTORMAN) wiped away the 'No-Go Areas', and established Army bases in the heart of the same areas, from which operations were mounted to dominate unit AOs; to gather intelligence; to reassure law-abiding residents whilst deterring the ungodly from the paths of wickedness, and; to kill or capture terrorists.

Thereafter the IRA were effectively wiped out because they tried to take on the army in a standup fight. 30 years of low-intensity political violence and manoeuvring ensued.

Fortunately, partly because we dominated their resupply lines, post-MOTORMAN urban firefights never required Army units to use indirect-fire weapons, and seldom (if ever) called for direct-fire weapons any heavier than a vehicle-mounted Browning 30 cal MG.

Originally Posted by HectortheInspector

The Taliban may be banking on the kind of morale collapse in the USA that took place after the Tet offensive, which militarily was a bloody disaster for the Vietnamese. The drawback is that a huge FIBUA operation to retake the town will involve heavy civilian casualties.

As I read the Cloggie general, he takes the view that - if NATO/ANA can significantly constrict Taliban import of arms and ammo - the kind of fighting you cite (in Hue) can be avoided.

Warsaw is not such a good example: the weapons available to the insurgents did not merit the scale of destruction inflicted by their enemies, whose aims were a million miles from anything that NATO might contemplate in AFG.

As to moral collapse: I don't doubt that you are correct - but even to my pro-western/anti-Taliban eyes, it looks as though Western gunmints are already 'wobbly'.

Even if 'we' really are not at all shaky, 'our' current outward appearance - as presented through all major media organs - will give significant encouragement to the enemy.

"As to moral collapse: I don't doubt that you are correct - but even to my pro-western/anti-Taliban eyes, it looks as though Western gunmints are already 'wobbly'.

Even if 'we' really are not at all shaky, 'our' current outward appearance - as presented through all major media organs - will give significant encouragement to the enemy."

Agreed. The simple fact is that the mass media that used to be at least patriotic and and worst jingoistic has become automatically pacifist/defeatist. There are few causes that the modern media would 'beat the drum' over. That is because the Iraq/Afghan conflicts are simply not seen as relevant to their audience. Without the threat of life, lib or national interest, these conflicts are seen as aspects of foreign policy, implemented by professional soldiers, and with increasingly little relevance to the national well being. As Vietnam proved, the morale of the US military easily surpassed that of the civilian population until quite late in the war, because they could see that they were consistently winning on the battlefield. It was only once the civilian defeatism infected the military that the US forces started to decline, especially when there was already a policy of disengagement in place.

The best way to win in Afghanistan is simply to assume now that we are going to be there for at least fifty years. Adopt that mind set now. Build permanent barracks. Employ locals on twenty-year contracts. This may require tour times to be lengthened for units, if not individuals, to several years. Indeed, train and recruit in theatre. Assume that some troops will actually spend the duration of their careers there. Marry the locals. Basically, all the stuff the Indian Army did under the Raj.

The Taliban say that Westerners have the wristwatches, but they have the time. Wrong. We have BOTH.They have one. All we have to do is remember this, and take their time weapon away from them.

Originally Posted by HectortheInspector

The Taliban say that Westerners have the wristwatches, but they have the time. Wrong. We have BOTH.They have one. All we have to do is remember this, and take their time weapon away from them.

Shortly after the beginning of the Iraq war (IIRC, at a time when Brits were still involved in concluding round 1 of the current fighting in AFG), I heard one of B'liar's spinmeisters responding to the question "What are the gunmints top 10 priorities?"

Defence was not one of them.

Even with a GWOT on 2 fronts - dealing with a supposedly existential threat to the nation - DEFENCE WAS NOT A TOP 10 PRIORITY

Reduces the chances of your "All we have to do" plan coming to pass, I'm afraid.

Originally Posted by Stonker

Originally Posted by HectortheInspector

The Taliban say that Westerners have the wristwatches, but they have the time. Wrong. We have BOTH.They have one. All we have to do is remember this, and take their time weapon away from them.

Shortly after the beginning of the Iraq war (IIRC, at a time when Brits were still involved in concluding round 1 of the current fighting in AFG), I heard one of B'liar's spinmeisters responding to the question "What are the gunmints top 10 priorities?"

Defence was not one of them.

Even with a GWOT on 2 fronts - dealing with a supposedly existential threat to the nation - DEFENCE WAS NOT A TOP 10 PRIORITY

Reduces the chances of your "All we have to do" plan coming to pass, I'm afraid.

Well, I'm afraid I might have to agree with you. My point about the current conflicts not being seen as true national interests, but, I suppose, 'Foreign policy discussions with loud noises and some nasty bloodstains' seems to stand.

One day, perhaps, the Treasury might do a cost benefit analysis on the merits of fighting a war and winning it, or fighting a war and losing it. Then there might be some serious thought given to winning. Its cheaper. Even more to not fighting silly wars in the first place. That's cheaper still.

Originally Posted by HectortheInspector

One day, perhaps, the Treasury might do a cost benefit analysis on the merits of fighting a war and winning it, or fighting a war and losing it. Then there might be some serious thought given to winning. Its cheaper. Even more to not fighting silly wars in the first place. That's cheaper still.

Half a generation ago, I asked myself "What is/are the overriding, common strategic national interest[s] that might bind the alliance together such that they would act in unison, over the former Yugoslav states?"

In the end, the answer had to be "The survival (and expansion) of NATO"

I see the alliance as being seriously at risk over AFG, but I don't detect the same commonality of interest in its survival.

Instead, nations are trying to figure out how they can individually sustain their economic/defence relationship with the USA at the least possible financial and political cost.

We're in AFG 'cos Unca Sam asked us to be, and if the members of our gunmint really do believe in the threat of global terror, they don't seem to believe we can fix it by acting decisively there.

Worst (and most likely) case is that they believe neither in the threat, nor in the 'solution', and haven't grasped the implications of a 'NATO failure'.

On NightWatch:

...
India-US: Comment. It is important for the US to maintain balance in its dealings in Asia. It is arguably more important for the US to make a statement of principle about free markets, entrepreneurial capitalism and freely elected representative government. Prime Minister Singh’s dinner tonight is the first state dinner of the Obama administration. The two leaders have met at least twice, talked and apparently got along.

For old hands, this dinner is an extraordinary event against the dim light and bitterness during the Cold War when the two greatest and largest democracies on Earth were hostile. It is good news.

The visit showcases the US tilt towards democracy, in the NightWatch interpretation, recognizing the extensive economic and political baggage that comes with such a tilt. Even with the baggage of arms sales and other economic linkages, it is more satisfying than siding with communist statism masquerading as democracy or militarism doing the same thing. Plus, the Indians seem to appreciate the limits of the US “tilt� and have limits of their own.

India-Pakistan: India’s Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, told ZeeNews that about 2,500 Pakistani militants are prepared to cross the country's border into India before snow closes the passes for the winter. Kapoor said India believes there are 42 militant training camps in Pakistan, and said Indian security forces are prepared to deal with any attempt to infiltrate the country.

Comment. Kapoor’s statement might accurately reflect a threat assessment from an Indian intelligence agency, but more likely reflects the number of militants in camps, including those preparing to infiltrate. The dissident infrastructure in Indian Kashmir does not seem capable of supporting more than 1,000 militant fighters are any one time, which is the upper limit of Kashmiri insurgent strength, according to public releases by Indian authorities earlier in the year.

The almost humorous dimension of the statement is that it coincides with the Prime Minister’s visit to the US during which he was to press the need for Pakistan to control the Kashmir border as well as the Afghan border. In the event the Prime Minister required more support, his Chief of Army Staff obliged. Good show, what.

Pakistan: For the record. A senior security force commander, Major General Tariq Khan, Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, said that South Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas will be divided into two separate agencies – one each for the Mehsud and Wazir tribes – bringing the number of FATA agencies to eight, Aaj TV reported Nov. 24.

Pakistan-NATO: NATO's recent withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan from near the Pakistani border is harming the U.S. approach that had sought to have militants face both NATO and Pakistani troops, The Times reported today, citing Pakistan Army commanders.

Militants are returning to Pakistan to fight in South Waziristan, unidentified sources said. Pakistan’s concerns were raised with U.S. National Security Adviser General (ret.) Jones during his November visit to Islamabad.

International Security Assistance Force troops reported withdrawal from six outposts bordering Pakistan's Waziristan -- four in Nurestan and two in Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Actually, Afghanistan’s Paktika Province is adjacent to South Waziristan. The Pakistan government also is concerned an increase in U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan without a clear strategy could destabilize Baluchistan, with an increase in refugees.

Comment. Pakistani authorities have consistently decried the removal of NATO forces from key border posts during Pakistan’s South Waziristan operations that began on 18 October. It is difficult to evaluate the Pakistani complaint because the reports on fighting in eastern Afghanistan and in South Waziristan of Pakistan provide no proof that fighters have moved across the border in any direction or in any numbers during the past month.

That finding is one of the more important. The Afghan Taliban apparently are not so connected to the Pakistani Taliban that they provide support to the Pashtun Wazirs who are under Pakistan Army pressure in South Waziristan. Despite Pakistani fears and claims, no public source information indicates the Afghan Taliban have rallied to support the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghans do not consider them comrades in a common fight and do not really like them for many reasons, including they divert financial support from Middle Eastern donors away from the anti-NATO fight in Afghanistan.

The foregoing observations put the lie to the notion of a monolithic Islamic threat that unifies the Afghanistan – Pakistan fighting. There is no AF-Pak problem, but separate and occasionally connected Afghanistan and a Pakistan problem. One solution does not fit both.

During the Pakistan Army operations, the Afghan Taliban have stayed out of the way and have not been attacked in any Pakistan province. A suspicious person might suspect a deal had been reached between the Pakistan Army and the Afghan Taliban leadership shura in Quetta, Baluchistan Province.

The obvious lack of unity among the opposition groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan is tonight’s good news and very good news for our and Pakistani tactical commanders.
...

My bold. Maintaining their close working relationship might be a better description than "deal".

But that last paragraph is true. The Northerners are giving out more and more worried signals about the Pakistani Taliban's destabilizing antics. FATA and Pak military tolerance is their strategic depth after all. Last thing they want is Lahore to start thinking they are a threat rather than asset.

It also makes it far harder to too spin that denying the TTP and their chums rear basing North of the Durand is vital to Pakistani security. Or that former ISI director and now Chief of Army Staff Kayani seriously intends to hinder the three main Afghan "talibans" we are fighting. They all have rear basing South of the Durand.

Reuters UK

U.S. will be out of Afghanistan by 2017 -White House
Wed Nov 25, 2009 11:01pm GMT

By Ross Colvin and Jeff Mason

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States will not be in Afghanistan eight years from now, the White House said on Wednesday, as President Barack Obama prepared to explain to Americans next week why he is expanding the war effort.

After months of deliberation and fending off Republican charges that he was dithering on Afghanistan while violence there surged, Obama will address the nation on Tuesday on the way forward in the costly and unpopular eight-year war.

He is expected to announce he is sending about 30,000 more troops as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy that will place greater emphasis on accelerating the training of Afghan security forces so that U.S. soldiers can eventually withdraw.

It appears highly unlikely Obama will offer a specific troop withdrawal timetable, but White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said the president would stress that the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was not open-ended.

"We are in year nine of our efforts in Afghanistan. We are not going to be there another eight or nine years," Gibbs told reporters. "Our time there will be limited and that is important for people to understand," he said.

He said Obama would use his prime-time televised speech to stress the "sheer cost" of the war, explain to Americans why their military was still in Afghanistan, and press Afghan President Hamid Karzai to improve governance after being re-elected in a fraud-tainted vote in August.

"The American people are going to want to know why we are here, they are going to want to know what our interests are," Gibbs said.

The White House has estimated it will cost $1 million per year for each additional soldier sent to Afghanistan. With the U.S. deficit hitting $1.4 trillion and fuelling Americans' concerns about high government spending, sending more troops to Afghanistan could be a politically risky move for Obama.

Obama's fellow Democrats, who control the U.S. Congress, face potentially difficult midterm elections in November 2010, with Republicans eager to exploit Americans' unease about the country's ballooning deficit and high unemployment.

Two veteran Democratic lawmakers have already called for imposing a "war tax" to pay for the troop increase.

Gibbs said Obama would meet with key lawmakers to brief them about his plan ahead of his Tuesday speech. Key committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate will hold back-to-back hearings next Wednesday and Thursday with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen.

Gibbs said the financial cost of the conflict -- which reached $6.7 billion in June alone -- and the physical toll it had taken on the U.S. military made the war unsustainable in the long term.

"It is very, very, very expensive," Gibbs said.

Obama will again press Karzai to improve the performance of his corruption-plagued government. Karzai's legitimacy was tarnished after a fraud-riddled election in August that saw millions of ballots favouring him thrown out.

"As the president has told President Karzai, there has to be a new chapter in Afghan governance and that is something the president will talk about on Tuesday," Gibbs said.

Obama has spent the past three months reviewing the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, where a resurgent Taliban has driven violence to its highest levels since U.S. forces invaded in 2001 to oust the militant Islamists for harbouring al Qaeda leaders responsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States.

The president has drawn fire from Republican critics for the time he has taken to reach a decision, but the White House has countered saying the former Bush administration neglected Afghanistan and allowed the security situation to deteriorate.

Obama's address to the nation at 8 p.m. EST on December 1 (1 a.m. British time December 2) from the West Point military academy in New York state will mark the end of a long process of deliberation that was characterized by a slow drip of leaks about the various options he was considering.

Angered by the leaks, which some analysts saw as an attempt by some in the administration to influence the president's thinking, Obama threatened to make them a firing offence.

(Additional reporting by Adam Entous; editing by Patricia Wilson and Eric Beech)

© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved.

My bold.

Democrats: "It's all about the economy stupid"

Sounds familiar, but this time they really mean it.

By "stupid" they still mean you voters, including all you campers out in the sand.

B

RAVC programme on animal health.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/suffolk/8378176.stm

Interesting as showing just how backwards the Afghan agricultural sector (AKA the economy) is.

8 Taliban militants killed in E Afghanistan
www.chinaview.cn 2009-11-26 13:10:30 Print
KHOST, Afghanistan, Nov. 26 (Xinhua) -- Eight militants were killed as Afghan and U.S.-led forces responded their attack in eastern Paktika province in Afghanistan, provincial administration spokesman said on Thursday.

"A group of Taliban militants attacked Afghan National Army (ANA) convoy in Sarhawza district late Wednesday," Hamidullah Jawak told Xinhua.

To respond the attack, he said ANA called on coalition troops and U.S.-led forces. Gunship helicopters pounded the position, killing eight rebels.

No causalities were reported on ANA, the official further said.

Taliban militants fighting Afghan, NATO and U.S. troops have yet to make comments.